Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement by Simons, Michael A.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 1 Article 1 
1-2003 
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement 
Michael A. Simons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol56/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 56 JANUARY 2003 NUMBER 1
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation,
Punishment, and Atonement
Michael A. Simons*
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 2
I. THE COOPERATION SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW ............................ 6
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
"Substantial Assistance" Departure ......................... 7
B. Cooperation Under the Guidelines ......................... 15
II. THE UTILITARIAN MODEL OF COOPERATION ...................... 22
III. COOPERATION AS PUNISHMENT: OSTRACISM AND
A LIEN ATIO N ......................................................................... 26
IV. COOPERATION AS ATONEMENT: REMORSE AND
EX PIA TIO N .......................................................................... 33
A. The Theory of Atonement ....................................... 33
B. Atonement and the Ideal Cooperator ..................... 41
C. Atonement and the Selfish Cooperator ................... 42
V. COOPERATION AS PUNISHMENT AND ATONEMENT:
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ..................................................... 44
Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law; Fellow, Vincentian Center for
Church and Society. B.A., 1986, College of the Holy Cross; J.D., 1989, Harvard University. I owe
thanks to John Barrett, Sam Levine, Brian Tamanaha, and the participants in the faculty
writing workshop at St. John's University School of Law for helpful comments, to Irene Mazun,
Eon Smith, and Brian Tretter for able research assistance, and to the Summer Research
Program at St. John's for financial assistance. As with all scholarship, my views about
cooperation are no doubt colored by my experiences. As a young lawyer doing white-collar
criminal defense work, I represented several clients who were investigated or prosecuted based
largely on the testimony of cooperators. More significantly, as an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1995 to 1998, I called over a dozen
cooperators as trial witnesses and interviewed countless other cooperators and would-be
cooperators.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. Using Cooperators ................................................. 44
1. The Scope of Cooperation ............................ 45
2. The Scope of the Guilty Plea ........................ 46
3. Mechanisms of Remorse and Apology ............ 48
4. Mechanisms of Reparation ............................. 50
B. Sentencing Cooperators ......................................... 51
C ON CLU SION ....................................................................... 54
INTRODUCTION
To mobsters, he is a "rat"; to drug dealers, a "snitch." To school
children, he is a "tattletale"; to corporate executives, a "whistle-
blower." To cops, he is an "informant"; to prosecutors, a "cooperator."
By whatever name he is known, the person who betrays his associates
to the authorities is almost universally reviled. In movies, on
television, in literature, the cooperator embodies all that society holds
in contempt: he is disloyal, deceitful, greedy, selfish, and weak.
The cooperator, though, has long been a mainstay of our
criminal justice system. For centuries, criminal defendants have
received leniency in return for testimony incriminating accomplices
and associates. Cooperation has flourished because the participants in
the process (primarily prosecutors and cooperators) reap tremendous
benefits. Prosecutors want what only cooperators can offer: inside
information about criminal organizations. And cooperators want what
only prosecutors can offer: leniency, or at least a recommendation for
leniency.1
1. By "cooperation," I mean the process by which a defendant (or a target of an
investigation) agrees to plead guilty and become a "cooperator." In return for the cooperator's
agreement to provide the prosecution with information and testimony, the prosecution agrees to
leniency, which typically takes the form of reduced charges, an agreed-upon sentence, or a
recommendation for leniency at the time of sentencing. See infra notes 61-92 and accompanying
text. "Cooperation," as I have defined it, does not include the widespread law enforcement
practice of using informants to gather information. Like a cooperator, an informant is often
involved in the illegal activity himself and provides law enforcement with information about his
accomplices. Unlike a cooperator, however, an informant typically does not plead guilty and is
compensated not in leniency, but in cash. See generally MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS,
THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 3-30 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing the general history and role
of the informer in criminal investigations and prosecutions).
As an aside, I refer to cooperators throughout this Article as "he" because the vast majority of
criminal defendants and cooperators are male. In federal court, approximately eighty-five
percent of criminal defendants are male, as are approximately eighty-five percent of cooperators.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 15 tbl.5,
available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/SBTOCOO.htm [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 42 tbl. 14; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GROUP, FEDERAL COURT PRACTICES: SENTENCING REDUCTIONS
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Cooperation has never been more prevalent than it is today. 2
And as cooperation has increased, so too have its critics. 3 Not
surprisingly, the typical academic view of cooperation is consistent
with the cultural view of cooperators: cooperation is almost always
seen as an evil-a necessary evil, no doubt, but an evil nonetheless. 4
As a result, cooperation is usually discussed in terms that are
starkly utilitarian. The cooperator is given leniency not because he
deserves it, but because leniency is a necessary part of the prosecutor's
"bargain with the devil." In the language of the marketplace, leniency
is the price that a prosecutor must pay to purchase the cooperator's
information and services. A criminal's cooperation is valuable-it is
worth buying-because the prosecutor can use it to convict other
criminals, who are often more culpable or more dangerous than the
cooperator. From the prosecutor's perspective, paying the cooperator
in leniency is a worthwhile investment because the benefit to the
prosecutor (and, by extension, to society) in increased convictions
outweighs the cost to the prosecutor (and, by extension, to society) in
leniency.
While intuitively appealing and largely accurate, this
utilitarian view of cooperation is incomplete. It is true that most
participants in the cooperation process-cooperators, prosecutors, law
BASED ON DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT app. F tbl.2 (1997)
[hereinafter SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE].
2. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or
Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (1993) (arguing that cooperation adversely affects cooperators by forcing
them to engage in amoral behavior); George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of
Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that cooperator testimony poses an
unacceptably high risk of perjury); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial
Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105 (1994) (arguing that
prosecutorial discretion over cooperation departures undercuts the goals of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines); Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety
Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1858 (1995) (detailing one
example of "the inequitable results associated with the substantial assistance exception"); Patti
Saris, Below the Radar Screen: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One
Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027 (1997) (examining sentencing disparities
created in part by differing prosecutorial policies regarding cooperation); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 211-12 (1993) (criticizing
cooperation for causing paradoxical disproportionalities in sentences); Ian Weinstein, Regulating
the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999) (summarizing problems associated with the
excessive use of cooperation).
4. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial
Revolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29
STETSON L. REV. 7, 46 (1999) (describing cooperation as an example of prosecutors "using
unsavory methods in pursuit of laudable ends"); Harris, supra note 3; Weinstein, supra note 3;
Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1992)
(examining the impact of cooperation on the criminal process).
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enforcement officers, defense counsel, and judges-view cooperation in
utilitarian terms. Yet cooperation also contains hidden, but important,
retributive components.
The retributive aspects of cooperation manifest themselves in
two ways. First, for many cooperators, cooperation itself is
punishment. At a minimum, the cooperator is alienated from the
defendants against whom he cooperates. Typically, a cooperator will
cooperate against his accomplices in a shared criminal enterprise.
Thus, he must turn against-betray, if you will-the very people with
whom he may be closest. More broadly, the "common disdain" in which
cooperators are held5 often means that the cooperator is ostracized not
only from his accomplices, but also from other communities that may
be important to him. Thus, cooperation can be viewed as extra
punishment-i.e., punishment that is not inflicted on a defendant who
merely pleads guilty without cooperating. The cooperator who suffers
this extra punishment, then, may deserve less traditional punishment
than a similarly situated noncooperating defendant.
Second, for some cooperators, cooperation can be a vehicle
through which the defendant experiences atonement. While it is no
doubt true that most defendants who cooperate do so (at least
initially) for selfish reasons, there is an occasional defendant for whom
the decision to cooperate is motivated by a genuine desire to make
amends for wrongdoing. Cooperation gives this defendant an
opportunity to undergo a process of expiation-remorse, apology,
reparation, and punishment-that can lead to true atonement. More
significantly, even for those defendants who start cooperating for
purely selfish reasons, cooperation can become (voluntarily or not) a
means of expiation. Whether the cooperator desires it or not, the
cooperation process forces a cooperator to express remorse and to
make reparation, if not directly to his victim, then to society. So even
for the selfish cooperator, cooperation can bring a defendant towards
atonement. Thus, to the extent that expiation lessens a defendant's
"just desert" (and I will argue that it does), a cooperator may deserve a
lesser sentence than a noncooperator-and for reasons wholly
unrelated to the return on the prosecution's leniency investment.
Moreover, this conception of cooperation as atonement speaks not only
to the cooperator's desert, but also to the utilitarian question of how
much punishment is needed to prevent the cooperator from
5. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 78 (1995); see also
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY 8 (1993) (noting that "[s]ome of the strongest moral epithets in
the English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the threshold of loyalty");
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 126
(Macmillan Coll. Publ'g Co. 3d ed. 1994) (1966) (discussing stigmatization of informants).
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reoffending. In other words, the cooperator who has experienced
atonement not only will deserve less punishment, but he will also need
less punishment.
It is not my aim to argue that cooperators deserve more
leniency than they currently receive. 6 Nor is it necessarily my aim to
defend the current prevalence of cooperation, which is a direct by-
product of the rigidity and severity of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 7 Instead, my argument is for a reconceptualization of
cooperation-a recognition that cooperation involves more than a
utilitarian calculus that weighs the social benefits of additional crime
fighting against the social costs of undeserved leniency. Cooperation
also involves punishment and expiation. In its ideal form, cooperation
can result in true atonement and ultimate reconciliation. And even in
its less-than-ideal form, cooperation can be an important step in
facilitating an offender's atonement-a process that is essential to
repairing the harm done by the offender and restoring the offender to
society.
This reconceptualization of cooperation does not reject the
typical utilitarian model. Indeed, a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis
explains much of what happens in cooperation. But punishment and
atonement-while secondary dynamics-are nevertheless important,
and not just for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the
cooperation system. These nonutilitarian aspects of cooperation have
important implications for how prosecutors should evaluate and use
cooperators, as well as for how judges should sentence cooperators.
This Article will present these alternative conceptions of
cooperation and explore their practical implications. Part I will
provide an overview of the cooperation system, focusing particularly
on how it works under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part II will
summarize the standard utilitarian model of cooperation. Part III will
explore the concept of cooperation as punishment. It will argue that
the extralegal punishment inherent in cooperation lessens the
cooperator's desert so that at least some of the sentencing leniency
received by the cooperator is "deserved" in a retributive sense. Part IV
will explore the concept of cooperation as atonement. In particular, it
will examine an atonement model of punishment developed by
6. Indeed, punishment is an essential part of the atonement model. See infra notes 176-78,
202 and accompanying text. Because expiation is incomplete without punishment, cooperation
without punishment cannot be atonement. See infra notes 176-78, 202.
7. I have argued elsewhere for increased cooperation, but only as a response to the
unnecessarily harsh drug sentences currently mandated by federal law. See Michael A. Simons,
Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 921 (2002).
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Stephen Garvey" and will apply that model both to the ideal
cooperator and to the selfish cooperator. That part will argue that
atonement is a worthwhile goal in itself (for both retributive and
utilitarian reasons) and one that is facilitated by cooperation. Finally,
Part V will explore the practical implications-both for prosecutors
and for judges-of this reconceptualization of cooperation.
I. THE COOPERATION SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW
Although our current cooperation system has a distinctly
modern feel, 9 the practice has existed in one form or another for
centuries. 10 Cooperation has its roots in the ancient common law
doctrine of approvement, whereby a defendant who confessed, testified
against his accomplices, and secured their convictions would receive a
pardon. 1 Eventually, the power to decide which witnesses should be
permitted to testify for the state shifted to the prosecutor,12 and by the
nineteenth century the practice of prosecutors negotiating with
defendants for testimony had become commonplace.1 3 Since then,
cooperation has remained a mainstay of our criminal justice system. 14
8. Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1810-29 (1999).
9. The cooperation system took its current form only after the rise of determinate
sentencing and the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the 1980s. See infra notes
19-60 and accompanying text.
10. See Harris, supra note 3, at 13-16 (discussing the history of cooperation); Hughes, supra
note 4, at 7-8 (same).
11. See Harris, supra note 3, at 13, 13 n.74 (citing 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF
PLEAS OF THE CROwN 280 (Sollem Emlyn ed., 1736); BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES BOOK 4
(Lewis ed., 1897)). The most obvious problem with approvement was that the approver's right to
a pardon depended upon his success in obtaining convictions. If the approver's testimony failed
to result in his accomplices' convictions (or, even if the approver's testimony varied in its
repetition of details), the approver was executed. See Harris, supra note 3, at 13-14. The
resulting temptations to commit perjury were overwhelming and led to approvement's
abandonment by the seventeenth century. See id.; Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116-17
(1775). Approvement was replaced by an "equitable" system in which the defendant who turned
"king's evidence" or "state's evidence" had an "equitable right," though not a "legal right," to
request a pardon. See Harris, supra note 3, at 13-14; Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1116.
12. See United States v. Ford ("The Whiskey Cases"), 99 U.S. 594, 603 (1878) (noting that "it
is regarded as the province of the public prosecutor and not of the court to determine whether or
not an accomplice, who is willing to criminate himself and his associates in guilt, shall be called
and examined for the State"); Harris, supra note 3, at 14-15, 15 n.84 (citing Commonwealth v.
Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477, 493 (1830)).
13. See The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 603-05. Writing in 1878, the Supreme Court
described a practice that sounds remarkably similar to current practice:
[1]n order to acquire the information necessary to determine the question, the public
prosecutor will grant the accomplice an interview, with the understanding that any
communications he may make to the prosecutor will be strictly confidential.
Interviews for the purpose mentioned are for mutual explanation, and do not
absolutely commit either party; but if the accomplice is subsequently called and
examined, he is equally entitled to a recommendation for executive clemency. Promise
2003] RETRIBUTION FOR RATS
Today, cooperation is more popular than ever. In federal
court, 15 almost one out of five defendants cooperates. 16 Many more
offer their services but are rebuffed by prosecutors. 17 The twin engines
driving this massive cooperation machinery are the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. And to
understand cooperation today, it is necessary to understand how the
Guidelines and mandatory minimums have changed sentencing.
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the "Substantial
Assistance" Departure
Congress inaugurated the Guidelines era with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which eliminated parole, created the United
States Sentencing Commission, and gave the Commission its
of pardon is never given in such an interview, nor any inducement held out beyond
what the before-mentioned usage and practice of the courts allow.
Prosecutors in such a case should explain to the accomplice that he is not obliged
to criminate himself, and inform him just what he may reasonably expect in case he
acts in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as to his own acts in the case, and
those of his associates. When he fulfils those conditions he is equitably entitled to a
pardon, and the prosecutor, and the court if need be, when fully informed of the facts,
will join in such a recommendation.
Id. at 603-04; see also Hughes, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that The Whiskey Cases discuss a
"familiar procedure" in "surprisingly modern terms").
14. See, e.g., United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759, 767 (6th Cir. 1966) (rejecting a ban on
cooperating witnesses as "a rule heretofore unknown in the jurisprudence of criminal
prosecutions"); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "[n]o practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system"); Harris, supra note 3, at 18
(noting that cooperation agreements "have become commonplace in modern criminal
prosecutions").
15. Although cooperation exists in every state, its use can vary greatly. See, e.g., Gould,
supra note 3, at 836 (noting that cooperation is less common in New York state courts than in
federal courts). In some states, a defendant may not be convicted based upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. See Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for
Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 790-91, 791 nn.40-41 (listing sixteen states,
including New York, that have established a corroboration rule by legislation and one that has
established it judicially); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Honorable John Gleeson, The
Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095,
1104-08 (1995) (arguing that the "different approach to accomplice testimony in state court
makes sense ... when considered in the context of the prototypical state prosecution, which
focuses on a discrete, isolated criminal act"). My analysis will focus on cooperation in the federal
system for several reasons: the federal system operates nationwide, cooperation is generally
more prevalent in the federal system than in state systems, critiques of cooperation have focused
on the federal system, and, not insignificantly, my experience with cooperation has been almost
entirely in the federal system.
16. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, 51 fig.G (illustrating the percentages of offenders
receiving each type of departure in federal courts); see also infra notes 54-60 and accompanying
text.
17. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 563-64; infra note 60.
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marching orders.18 Two years later, Congress continued its sentencing
reform with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which created harsh
mandatory sentences for many narcotics offenses. 19 In 1987, the
Commission's Sentencing Guidelines went into effect, 20 and the
practice of criminal law in federal court has never been the same.
Before the Guidelines took effect in 1987, federal judges
usually had wide, almost unfettered discretion in sentencing
defendants. 21 Most federal crimes provided (and still provide) only a
maximum sentence. For example, the legislatively proscribed penalty
for bribing a public official is imprisonment for "not more than fifteen
years";22 the penalty for armed bank robbery is imprisonment for "not
more than twenty-five years";23 and the penalty for kidnapping is
imprisonment for "any term of years or for life."24 Moreover, in
deciding whether to sentence a defendant to the minimum (including a
suspended sentence), 25 the maximum, or something in between, pre-
Guidelines judges were not constrained in what factors they could
consider and the weight to give those factors. 26 Thus, while the
18. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-
59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2000)); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y.
Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (chronicling the legislative history of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
19. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
(2000)).
20. See Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228.
21. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 3-11
(1972) (describing the "almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers" given to sentencing
judges under pre-Guidelines law; KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-29 (1998) (discussing the history of federal
criminal sentencing before the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines); Ian Weinstein, The
Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of
Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 506-08 (1999) (describing the
"[o]ld law discretionary sentencing," which "gave federal judges unreviewable and, within the
statutory maximum, standardless power to choose the punishment in a given case").
22. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2000).
23. § 2113(d).
24. § 1201(a). Although a few federal criminal statutes provide minimum as well as
maximum sentences, few of those statutes predate the Guidelines era. In any event, the
resulting range is typically extremely broad. For example, the authorized prison sentence for
distributing five hundred grams of cocaine ranges from a minimum of five years to a maximum
of forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000).
25. Before the Guidelines took effect, judges generally had the authority to suspend any
sentence, replacing it with a probationary term. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 572 n.30 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II,
212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (effective Nov. 1, 1987)).
26. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (noting that the sentencing judge
could consider "the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics"). The disparities that resulted from this unfettered discretion were the heart of
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seriousness of the offense was typically an important factor in setting
a sentence, judges were also free to consider (or not to consider) the
defendant's criminal history, age, education, employment, family
background, family responsibilities, charitable works, health, history
of substance abuse, behavior at trial, assistance to the authorities,
remorse, or any other factor that the judge considered relevant.27
The Sentencing Guidelines have changed all that. Sentences
are now determined by reference to a grid that establishes over 250
separate sentencing ranges. 28 A defendant's sentencing range is
determined by combining a mathematical score for the seriousness of
the offense with a mathematical score for the defendant's criminal
history. Judicial discretion is severely restrained.29 The Guidelines
enumerate, 30 sometimes in minute detail, those factors that determine
the seriousness of the offense (such as the amount of money stolen, the
extent of the physical injury inflicted, or the quantity of drugs
distributed) and those factors that determine the blameworthiness of
the offender (such as the defendant's role in the offense or abuse of a
position of trust). Many other factors that often played a central role
Judge Frankel's influential criticism of pre-Guidelines sentencing. See generally FRANKEL, supra
note 21. Eliminating those disparities was the major justifying purpose of the Sentencing
Guidelines. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 21, at 104 (asserting that "[r]eduction of
'unwarranted sentencing disparities' was a-probably the goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984").
27. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINALS 88-92, 102-05 (1988) (explaining how judges considered an offender's criminal
record and life history); FRANKEL, supra note 21, at 7-8, 18-25 (discussing broad judicial
discretion in sentencing and providing examples of this discretion); see, e.g., United States v.
Hernandez, 617 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that a codefendant was given leniency
because of his age (twenty-five), remorse, and drug addiction); United States v. Bergman, 416 F.
Supp. 496, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (considering the defendant's lack of criminal history, his age,
health, employment, and charitable works).
28. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2002), available at
www.ussc.gov/2002guid/tabconO2-2.htm [hereinafter 2002 GUIDELINES]. For a good introduction
to how the Guidelines work, see Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained,
and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679,
690-704 (1996). See also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6-31 (1988) (describing how the
Guidelines work and the compromises that the Sentencing Commission made during the drafting
process).
29. As Frank Bowman has opined: "The whole point of the guidelines was to hem in district
courts with a set of rules created by the Commission and enforced by the courts of appeals."
Frank 0. Bowman III, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 19, 19 (1996); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 21, at 78-103 (criticizing
the Guidelines for restricting judicial discretion).
30. By 2002, the Guidelines had grown to over four hundred pages of guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28.
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in pre-Guidelines sentencing-including most individual offender
characteristics-now have no effect on the mathematical calculation. 31
The resulting sentencing ranges are significantly narrower
than under pre-Guidelines law.3 2 For example, the pre-Guidelines
defendant who paid a $10,000 bribe to a judge faced a sentence
between 0 and 180 months;33 under the Guidelines, the same
defendant now faces a sentencing range of 27 to 33 months. 34 An
armed bank robbery committed before the Guidelines could have
resulted in any sentence between 0 and 300 months;35 the comparable
Guidelines sentencing range is 70 to 87 months.36 A pre-Guidelines
defendant who kidnapped (but did not harm) a victim faced a sentence
of zero to life;3 7 the Guidelines sentencing range for that crime is 97 to
121 months.38
Not only are the Guidelines sentencing ranges narrower, the
minimum sentences are-on average-more severe than pre-
Guidelines sentences. For some offenses, this increased severity has
31. The Guidelines provide that age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional
conditions, physical condition, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, military,
civic, charitable, and public service, and prior good works are "not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." 2002
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, §§ 5H1.1-1.6, 5Hl.ll, introductory cmt. Judges may still consider
those factors in deciding what sentence to impose within the relatively narrow Guidelines
sentencing range. In addition, sentencing judges may rely on those factors to depart from the
Guidelines sentencing range when such factors are present "to an exceptional degree." See Koon
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). Other factors, including drug or alcohol dependence,
lack of guidance as a youth, and economic hardship, are never appropriate grounds for departure
from the Guidelines sentencing range. See id. at 93; 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, §§ 5H1.4,
5H1.12, 5K2.12.
32. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the Sentencing Commission,
mandated that the maximum of any sentencing range not exceed the minimum by more than
twenty-five percent or six months, whichever is greater. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000); 2002
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(h).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2000) (providing a sentence of "not more than fifteen years"
imprisonment for bribery of public officials and witnesses).
34. This sentence is based on a Guidelines offense level of eighteen, which results from a
base offense level of ten for public bribery and an eight-level enhancement for a bribe involving a
payment to a "high-level decisionmaking" official, such as a judge. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra
note 28, § 2C1.1, ch. 5, pt. A.
35. See 18 U.S.C § 2113(d) (2000) (providing a sentence of "not more than twenty-five years"
imprisonment for a bank robbery that "puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a
dangerous weapon").
36. This sentence is based on a Guidelines offense level of twenty-seven, which results from
a base offense level of twenty for robbery, plus a two-level enhancement for robbing a bank and a
five-level enhancement for "brandishing" a gun. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 2B3.1,
ch. 5, pt. A.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
38. This sentence is based on a Guidelines offense level of thirty, which results from a base
offense level of twenty-four for kidnapping, plus a six-level enhancement for demanding a
ransom. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 2A4.1, ch. 5, pt. A.
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resulted from policy choices made by the Sentencing Commission.39
For other offenses, the increased severity has resulted from
congressional enactments-particularly mandatory minimum
sentences for narcotics and firearm offenses-that have been
incorporated into the Guidelines. 40 The net result has been a
significant increase in sentence severity. In the first decade of
Guidelines sentencing, federal prison terms more than doubled. 41
39. For example, the Commission made a conscious choice to increase sentence severity for
white-collar offenses. See Breyer, supra note 28, at 20-21 (discussing the Commission's "decision
to increase the severity of punishment for white-collar crime" by requiring imprisonment "for
many white-collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and antitrust offenders, who
previously would have likely received only probation"); 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, ch. 1,
pt. A(3) (noting the Commission's conclusion that economic crime in the pre-Guidelines era had
been "punished less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior"); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS 18 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. The Commission also chose to
increase sentences for some violent crimes. See id. at 19; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 21, at
60-61.
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000) (setting sentences for narcotics offenses); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) & (e) (2000) (setting minimum sentences for firearm offenses). Although Congress had
enacted occasional mandatory sentences throughout its history, the modern era of mandatory
minimums began in 1984, the same year that Congress created the Sentencing Commission. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 8 (1991) ("Beginning in 1984, and every two years thereafter, Congress enacted an array
of mandatory minimum penalties specifically targeted at drugs and violent crime."). The most
significant mandatory minimums were created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
provided minimum prison terms of five years and ten years for offenses involving certain
quantities of drugs. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000)); Barbara Meierhofer, The Severity of Drug Sentences: A Result of Purpose
or Chance?, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 34, 34-35 (1999). The Sentencing Commission then used
those congressionally mandated sentences as the framework for all drug sentences-increasing
or decreasing the sentencing range as the quantity of drugs increased or decreased. See
Meierhofer at 35; 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 2D1.1(c) (setting forth different base offense
levels for various drug quantities). Because drug offenses account for over forty percent of all
federal sentences, see 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 12 tbl.3, the drug mandatory
minimums and their attendant guidelines have markedly increased overall sentence severity.
See Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity: 1980-
1998, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 12, 14, 17 (1999) (concluding that the average prison time
expected to be served by federal drug offenders sentenced in 1992 was almost three times longer
than it had been for federal drug offenders sentenced in 1984).
41. See WILLIAM J. SABOL & JOHN MCGREADY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TIME
SERVED IN PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS, 1986-1997 1 (1999) ("Overall, time to be served
increased from 21 months, on average, for those entering Federal prison during 1986 to 47
months for those entering during 1997."), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tspfo97.pdf;
Hofer & Semisch, supra note 40, at 17 (stating that "federal offenders sentenced in 1998 will
spend about twice as long in prison, on average, as did offenders sentenced in 1984"). Although
the Guidelines (and statutory minimums reflected in the Guidelines) may not be responsible for
all of this increased severity, a 1999 study by Sentencing Commission staff found a significant
correlation between increased sentences for particular crimes and corresponding changes in the
Guidelines, leading the researchers to conclude that the Guidelines "are a primary, if not the
primary, cause" of the increased severity. Hofer & Semisch, supra note 40, at 18. Incarceration
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Although judges are permitted to "depart" from the narrow
ranges set by the Guidelines, that authority is severely limited. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States,42 sentencing
judges may depart from Guidelines sentencing ranges in three
situations. First, a departure may be appropriate if the judge finds "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines."43 The Commission has expressed its view
that such departures will be "highly infrequent" because the
Guidelines, in the Commission's view, already take into account the
relevant sentencing factors. 44 Second, a departure may be appropriate
if the judge finds a sentencing factor that the Commission has deemed
"not ordinarily relevant" that is "present to an exceptional degree."45
Again, in the Commission's view, such cases will be "extremely rare."46
Finally, the sentencing judge may depart if the Guidelines specifically
encourage such a departure. 47 Most "encouraged" departures are
upward departures. 4 Of the "encouraged" downward departures, only
one is invoked with any regularity: the departure for "substantial
assistance"-the cooperator's departure. 49
Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provides that a judge "may
depart" from the Guidelines sentencing range "[u]pon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense." 50 A cooperating defendant may also receive
rates have also increased under the Guidelines, as fewer and fewer defendants are sentenced to
probationary terms. See id. at 13-15; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 21, at 62-63.
42. 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000); 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b); see also
Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.
44. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (2000); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.
45. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K2.0 (2000); Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.
46. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K2.0, cmt. (2000).
47. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.
48. See, e.g., 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K2.1 (encouraging upward departures for
offenses involving death); § 5K2.2 (physical injury); § 5K2.3 (psychological injury); § 5K2.4
(abduction or unlawful restraint); § 5K2.5 (property damage or loss); § 5K2.6 (weapons and
dangerous instrumentalities); § 5K2.7 (disruption of government function); § 5K2.8 (extreme
conduct); § 5K2.14 (offenses that "significantly endangered" public welfare); § 5K2.17 (high-
capacity, semiautomatic firearms); § 5K2.18 (violent street gangs); § 5K2.21 (dismissed and
uncharged conduct). Notwithstanding the number of these encouraged departures, upward
departures are imposed in less than one percent of all Guidelines sentences. See 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, 51 fig.G (illustrating the percentages of offenders receiving each type
of departure in federal courts).
49. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1.
50. Id. The "substantial assistance" departure was created in response to a congressional
directive in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984:
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a sentence below any statutorily mandated minimum. 51 Significantly,
once the prosecution files a substantial assistance motion, the
ultimate sentence becomes purely discretionary-the extent of the
departure is neither constrained by the Guidelines nor reviewable on
appeal. 52
In a Guidelines system characterized by rigid rules, severe
sentences, and sharply limited judicial discretion, cooperation
departures are a striking exception. For many defendants, the lure of
the cooperation departure is irresistible-it is usually the only
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness
of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence
that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense.
28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000). Although Congress did not direct the Sentencing Commission to
condition substantial assistance departures on a government motion, Congress had imposed the
government motion requirement in the analogous provision that allows cooperators to receive
sentences below the statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
51. See § 3553(e); 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1, cmt. n.1; 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
While a court may depart from the Guidelines sentencing range for a variety of reasons, see
supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text, "substantial assistance" is one of only two
justifications for imposing a sentence below a statutorily mandated minimum. The other is the
"safety valve" enacted by Congress in 1994, which permits a modest sentence reduction for the
least culpable narcotics offenders. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000)).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the extent of a substantial assistance departure). The
Guidelines provide a list of factors that the sentencing court may consider in evaluating the
defendant's cooperation:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's
assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance
rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's
assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's
assistance.
2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1. Although this list is not exhaustive and sentencing
judges are encouraged to consider "variable relevant factors," id. § 5K1.1, cmt. background, most
courts have held that the 5K1.1 departure must be based on the defendant's cooperation and not
on other mitigating factors. See, e.g., United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1156 & n.6 (1st
Cir. 1993) ("As a basis for departing [under § 5K1. 1], a court may consider mitigating factors only
to the extent that they can fairly be said to touch upon the degree, efficacy, timeliness, and
circumstances of a defendant's cooperation."). Nevertheless, as one federal district judge has
observed, the latitude afforded sentencing judges to reduce a sentence based upon. "variable
relevant factors," gives judges the ability "to import a wide range of mitigating circumstances
into the departure calculus." Bruce M. Seyla & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of
Substantial Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 819
(1994) (noting that, for example, a defendant's "family circumstances" might affect the court's
evaluation of the danger that cooperation posed to the defendant or his family).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1
significant sentencing factor over which they have any control, and it
is often their only hope for a significantly reduced sentence. 53
Not surprisingly, the Sentencing Guidelines have ushered in
dramatic increases in cooperation.5 4 Although no statistics exist on
cooperation before the Guidelines, statistics from the early days of the
Guidelines provide some indication of pre-Guidelines practice.5 5 In
1989, the first year for which the Sentencing Commission kept
statistics on cooperation, 3.5% of defendants sentenced under the
Guidelines received substantial assistance departures. 56 It is likely
that cooperation was even less frequent before 1989.57 Since 1994,
however, approximately 20% of all federal defendants have received
cooperation departures. 58 In narcotics cases, cooperation levels exceed
30%.59 Many more defendants offer to cooperate in an effort to earn
the coveted departure. 60
53. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 577. The other sentencing factor over which defendants
have control is the modest two-point or three-point reduction in offense level they can earn by
"accepting responsibility" for their criminal conduct (usually by pleading guilty). See 2002
GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 3E1.1; Weinstein, supra note 3, at 575 (describing the acceptance
of responsibility reduction as "all too minor" for many defendants).
54. For a detailed discussion of cooperation rates under the Sentencing Guidelines, see
Simons, supra note 7, at 935-38.
55. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 563 n.2.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
39 fig.G (1996), available at www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/sourcbk.htm [hereinafter 1996
SOURCEBOOK].
57. By 1989, the Guidelines had already been in effect for a full year. Moreover, the harsh
mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics offenses established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 had already been in effect for two full years. See Pub L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-848 (2000)). In 1989, substantial assistance was the only way to
avoid those mandatory minimum sentences. See supra note 51.
58. See 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 56, at 39 fig.G; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at
51 fig.G. Cooperation departures grew rapidly in the first five years of the Guidelines: from 3.5%
in 1989, to 7.5% in 1990, 11.9% in 1991, 15.1% in 1992, 16.9% in 1993, and 19.5% in 1994. See
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 56, at 39 fig.G. From 1995 through 1999, cooperation departures
remained at or near 19%. See Simons, supra note 7, at 937 fig.1 (illustrating changing
cooperation rates). In 2000, cooperation departures declined slightly, to just under 18%. Id.
59. From 1996 through 2000, cooperation departures were granted in thirty-one percent of
narcotics trafficking cases prosecuted in federal court. See Simons, supra note 7, at 941 n.96.
60. For example, in one study the Sentencing Commission reviewed sixty-four randomly
selected conspiracy prosecutions from 1992 in which at least one defendant cooperated. See
LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL
YARDSTICK 9, 26 exh.5 (1998). Of the 264 defendants in those cases for which information was
available, 158 (or 67.5%) provided some kind of assistance to the government, though only 61 (or
38.6%) received substantial assistance departures. Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 563,
592 (noting that many defendants offer to cooperate but fail to close the deal and that "[d]espite
all the disincentive and risks, defendants flock to proffer sessions"). My experience as a federal
prosecutor was similar. For example, in one racketeering case I prosecuted, seven of the eight
defendants either cooperated or offered to cooperate. This level of cooperation (or would-be-
cooperation) was not unusual in multidefendant cases. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
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B. Cooperation Under the Guidelines
The cooperation process usually begins with a series of
meetings involving the prosecutor, the agents involved in the case, the
defense attorney, and the would-be cooperator.6 1 These debriefing
sessions-sometimes called "proffer sessions"62-serve dual purposes.
First, if the defendant has not yet decided to cooperate, the prosecutor
may attempt to persuade the defendant that the evidence against him
is overwhelming and that cooperating is his only option.63 Second, if
the defendant decides he wants to cooperate, he must convince the
prosecutor that he has valuable information or services to offer-in
other words, that he can provide "substantial assistance." The
defendant typically provides his information to the prosecutor
pursuant to a limited use immunity agreement called a "queen-for-a-
day" agreement.6 4 The prosecutor and the law enforcement agents
1, at 48 (reporting that in one large U.S. Attorney's office "it was not unusual for all the
defendants in a drug conspiracy to cooperate and receive a departure" (emphasis added)).
61. From the defendant's perspective, the process begins even sooner-when the defense
lawyer educates the defendant about the Sentencing Guidelines and advises the defendant about
his options, including cooperation. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors:
Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 929 (1999)
("Competent defense lawyers must discuss the option of cooperation with clients early on in the
representation."). For an insightful discussion of the ethical and professional issues facing
defense lawyers in this context, see Richman, supra note 5.
62. See John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POLY 423, 447-450 (1997) (describing proffer
sessions); Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1401-06 (1996) (offering a federal judge's advice on how to conduct proffer
sessions); Yaroshefsky, supra note 61, at 952-62 (discussing various ways in which prosecutors
conduct proffer sessions).
63. See Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures: Valuable
Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 41, 42 (1999).
64. The typical "queen-for-a-day" agreement provides the defendant with very limited use
immunity, and even that immunity will be waived if the defendant later testifies in a way that is
inconsistent with his statements in the proffer session. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513
U.S. 196, 198, 210 (1995) (approving use of proffer statements to impeach defendant's
testimony); Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Are "Queen for a Day" Pacts Courtesans?,
N.Y. L.J., June 13, 2001, at 1 (noting that proffer agreements have traditionally allowed
prosecutors to use the proffer statement to impeach the defendant's testimony and develop
leads). Some agreements also provide that the prosecution may use the defendant's proffer
statements if the defense presents at trial any evidence or argument inconsistent with the
proffer statements (even if the defendant does not testify). See id. Courts have been split,
however, on whether such provisions are appropriate. Compare United States v. Krilich, 159
F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing the introduction of the defendant's proffer
statements when defendant's cross-examination of a government witness took a position
contradictory to the proffer statements), with United States v. Duffy, 133 F. Supp. 2d 213, 215-
16, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (invalidating that provision of a standard proffer agreement and
expressing doubt as to whether the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court will reach the same
result as the Seventh Circuit in Krilich).
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may debrief the defendant many times in an effort to evaluate the
defendant and his information. 65 During these debriefings, the
prosecutor will demand detailed information not only about the facts
at issue, but also about any aspect of the cooperator's life that could be
used to impeach him (from past criminal conduct, to noncriminal "bad
acts" that reflect a bad character for veracity, to any biases the
cooperator may have against the targets of his cooperation). 66
In evaluating the ultimate utility of the defendant's
cooperation, the prosecutor will look to several factors, such as the
number of other people who can be prosecuted based on the
defendant's information, the seriousness of the crimes committed by
those other people, and whether the defendant's information is
cumulative of other evidence that the prosecution already has or can
obtain. 67 The prosecutor must also evaluate whether the defendant is
being truthful and whether the defendant will make a compelling
witness. 6s The prosecutor will then weigh the value of the defendant's
cooperation against the defendant's own culpability-the seriousness
of the defendant's wrongdoing. 69 Both as a matter of criminal justice
policy and prosecutorial tactics, prosecutors generally avoid using
cooperators who are more culpable than the people against whom they
are cooperating. 70
65. See United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A crucial part of the
process by which a cooperating witness gives information and assistance to the government and
is in turn promised a reward at sentencing is the debriefing session. The usefulness to the
prosecutor of the defendant's cooperation in debriefing usually determines whether the
government will make a § 5K1.1 motion."); Yaroshefsky, supra note 61, at 930 ("Typically, there
are a number of debriefing sessions prior to the government making a decision that the
defendant should be signed up for a cooperation agreement.").
66. See Gleeson, supra note 62, at 448-49 ('The prosecutor also uses proffer sessions to
determine what 'baggage' a witness will bring to the witness stand at trial. Because future cross-
examinations of the witness will not be limited to the crimes under investigation, the prosecutor
needs to know about all of the criminal activity in the witness's past, whether or not the
government is aware of it."). This information about the cooperator's background is important
not only to help the prosecutor evaluate the cooperator's credibility and culpability, but also
because, if the cooperator testifies, any information that may be used to impeach him must be
disclosed to the defense. See United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
67. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 30-32; Hughes, supra note 4, at 13-15.
68. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 61, passim (reporting ways in which prosecutors
attempt to discern whether cooperators are being truthful).
69. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 30-32; Hughes, supra note 4, at 13-15.
70. Criticism of cooperation under the Guidelines has often focused on the so-called
cooperation paradox-the anomaly created when the more culpable member of a conspiracy
cooperates and receives a lesser sentence than less culpable members of the conspiracy who may
have less information to give and therefore cannot cooperate. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 3,
at 212 ("Minor players, peripherally involved and with little knowledge or responsibility, have
little to offer and thus can wind up with far more severe sentences than the boss."); Weinstein,
supra note 3, at 611-12. The available empirical data, however, indicate that the "cooperation
paradox" is a problem in theory, but not in practice. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1,
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If the prosecutor agrees that the defendant should be "signed
up" as a cooperator, the parties will execute a written agreement. The
agreement typically will impose two obligations on the defendant.
First, the defendant will agree to plead guilty. In some districts, a
cooperator is required to plead guilty not only to the criminal conduct
for which he was arrested, but also to any other serious criminal
conduct that is revealed during the proffer sessions, even conduct
completely unrelated to the crimes that led to the cooperator's arrest
and even conduct for which the government's only proof is the
cooperator's proffer. 71 Second, the defendant will agree to cooperate,
which generally entails providing the government with all requested
information, testifying whenever requested, and doing so truthfully.72
The prosecution, in turn, will agree to bring the defendant's
cooperation to the attention of the court through a section 5K1.1
motion if: (1) the defendant complies with his obligations under the
agreement (including testifying truthfully), and (2) the prosecution
determines that the defendant's assistance was "substantial."73 In
some districts, the cooperation agreement will also include provisions
at 73-108 (describing a detailed study of cooperation in sixty-four randomly selected conspiracies,
many of them narcotics conspiracies); MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 60, at 13 ("The oft-cited
'truth' that drug conspiracy members at the top of the organization are more likely to secure
reduced sentences due to substantial assistance than those lower in the criminal organization is
not supported by these exploratory data."). These data are consistent with my experience as a
prosecutor and with common sense. See Trott, supra note 62, at 1392 (Among four "[g]eneral
[riules of [t]humb for the [c]areful [pirosecutor" in dealing with cooperators, the first is "[m]ake
agreements with 'little fish' to get 'big fish' ").
71. In these districts, would-be cooperators must disclose all of their criminal conduct
throughout their life during the proffer sessions. The subsequent plea to this additional criminal
conduct may significantly increase the cooperators' sentencing exposure. See Gleeson, supra note
62, at 449 & n.109. For example, if cooperator who is arrested for narcotics trafficking is
required, as part of his cooperation agreement, to plead guilty to a homicide that was revealed
only in proffer sessions, he could see his Guidelines sentence (before the cooperation departure)
increase from ten years to life. See id.; Yaroshefsky, supra note 61, at 928-29. Not all districts,
however, follow this practice. See Gleeson, supra note 62, at 449 n.10.
72. See John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797,
1829-30 (2001); Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informant and Accomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L.
REV. 679, 685-86 (1999) (listing factors prosecutors should consider in drafting plea agreements
with cooperators). The defendant will also typically be required to waive certain rights, including
the right to appeal his sentence. See Douglass, supra, at 1830.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the
terms of a cooperation agreement); United States v. Tejada, 773 F. Supp. 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (summarizing a "standard" cooperation agreement); United States v. Alli-Balogun, Nos. 96
Civ. 5949 (JFK), 93 Cr. 230 (JFK), 1998 WL 42570, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998) (noting that the
defendant's principle obligations under a cooperation agreement were to "provide truthful
information at all times, provide documents and information as requested by the Government,
testify if necessary, and not commit any additional crimes").
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about the extent of the sentencing reduction or the prosecution's
recommendation. 74
The cooperator will then plead guilty and begin cooperating.
For some cooperators, not much else will be required. Because federal
prosecutors may obtain warrants and indictments based on hearsay,75
additional prosecutions may be commenced without the cooperator's
direct involvement. Moreover, because most federal prosecutions
result in guilty pleas,76 the cooperator may never be required to
testify. 77 For many cooperators, however, signing the agreement is
only the beginning of a lengthy process that starts with numerous
debriefing sessions, extends to intensive witness preparation, and
culminates in public testimony.78
The cooperator typically will not be sentenced, however, until
his cooperation is complete. Prosecutors postpone the cooperator's
sentencing for two reasons. First, by delaying the sentencing benefit
(and by delaying the prosecution's determination of whether the
cooperator's assistance has been "substantial"), the prosecution
74. See Safer & Crowl, supra note 63, at 43. A 1997 Sentencing Commission survey found
that approximately one-third of all districts do not make any specific sentence recommendation
for cooperators, while the other two-thirds make use of binding sentence agreements under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C) or recommended sentence agreements under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B). See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at
33-34. Even in those districts where the prosecution does not make a specific sentencing
recommendation, such as the Southern District of New York where I practiced, the prosecutor's
description of the defendant's cooperation typically carries significant weight at sentencing. See,
e.g., Ming He, 94 F.3d at 786-87 (providing the cooperator a mere five percent sentence reduction
after the prosecution "disparaged" the cooperator's assistance).
75. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (approving indictment based
solely on hearsay testimony); United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2000)
(approving search warrant based on hearsay).
76. In 2000, over ninety-five percent of all federal prosecutions were resolved by guilty plea.
See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 20 fig.C.
77. See Gleeson, supra note 62, at 451 (noting that a cooperator may never even be
"debriefed" following the execution of the agreement "[i]f the other targets of the investigation all
plead guilty").
78. The debriefing sessions and preparation sessions will typically cover the same ground
as the proffer sessions-though in far more detail. One former federal prosecutor (now a federal
judge) has described this "process of eliciting details and preparing testimony" as "laborious (and
sometimes excruciatingly boring)." See id. Often, the most laborious part of the process is not
eliciting the details about the criminal activity of others, but rather eliciting the details about the
cooperator's own criminal activity, especially criminal activity unrelated to the events under
investigation. See id. at 449-50. While cooperators will usually readily admit at least some of
their criminality, "the temptation to minimize it is strong." See id. at 448. It is essential for the
prosecutor to elicit this information, however, as the cooperator's criminal background will
ordinarily account for a substantial portion of the cooperator's direct testimony and an even more
substantial portion of the cooperator's cross-examination. See id. at 448-49.
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maintains maximum leverage over the defendant. 79 Second, the
cooperator who has not yet received his sentencing benefit may make
a more compelling witness. The cooperator can truthfully testify that
he does not know whether his sentence will be reduced or how much it
will be reduced; he just knows that he has to "tell the truth" and the
rest is up to the judge.80
Whether assistance will be considered "substantial" varies from
district to district and even from prosecutor to prosecutor.81 At a
minimum, the cooperator must provide the government with
information about the criminal activity of others. The mere providing
of "intelligence," however, usually will not amount to substantial
assistance.8 2 More often, the cooperator will be required to testify-or
79. See Douglass, supra note 72, at 1830 n.142 (noting that delaying sentencing "creates
maximum control over the cooperating witness"); Rowland, supra note 72, at 686 (instructing
prosecutors to not commit to substantial assistance departure "until the witness has fulfilled his
agreement to cooperate fully"). This leverage is significant, because the prosecution retains
almost complete discretion to determine whether the cooperator's assistance is "substantial." See
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (holding that the prosecution's refusal to
make a substantial assistance motion for a cooperator is reviewable only if it is "based on an
unconstitutional motive" or is "not rationally related to any legitimate Government end").
80. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 15, at 1122; Richman, supra note 5, at 97.
81. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 60, at 26 exh.5 (describing the different types of
cooperation engaged in by a sample of sixty-one cooperators). It is difficult to generalize about
the circumstances in which assistance is considered "substantial" because practices vary-
sometimes significantly-among the ninety-four United States Attorney's Offices. See
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 42-52 (describing varying cooperation practices in
eight districts); Lee, supra note 3, at 125-28 (summarizing prosecutors' differing departure
policies in the Central District of Illinois and the District of Columbia); Lisa M. Farabee,
Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30
CONN. L. REV. 569, 588-91 (1998) (noting prosecutors' differing views of substantial assistance
departures in the District of Massachusetts and the District of Connecticut); Ilene H. Nagel &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 555-56 (1992)
(comparing 5K1.1 practices in three U.S. Attorney's Offices and concluding that one office had
"the tightest policy with respect to what is required" for a cooperation departure, while a second
office had "a rather liberal definition of who and what qualify" for the departure, and a third
office had "virtually no standard for determining what qualifies" for the departure).
Generalizations are also complicated by the practice of prosecutors in some districts of seeking
substantial assistance departures for "sympathetic" defendants whose assistance may not
actually have been "substantial." See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra, at 524 (noting that prosecutors
in one district "indicated that the more sympathetic the defendant, the lower the standard for
what qualifies as substantial assistance").
82. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 81, at 541 (noting that in one district defendants
were expected to provide "more than just intelligence" to qualify for a substantial assistance
departure). But see SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 57 (noting that in two out of eight
districts surveyed "participants reported that providing truthful information to the government
(irrespective of the results) might generate a substantial assistance motion by the government").
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at least to agree to testify-about the information he is disclosing.8 3
Cooperators can also provide the government with tangible evidence.
8 4
In the most involved cases, cooperators will actively participate in
covert operations, for example by "wearing a wire" to record
conversations with criminal associates. 8 5  Moreover, whether a
cooperator's assistance is considered "substantial" will often turn on
whether the cooperation yields concrete results.8 6
Cooperators' targets also vary. Traditionally, and most
commonly, cooperators provide information about and testify against
their accomplices. As cooperation has expanded under the Sentencing
Guidelines, however, the targets of the cooperation are often farther
and farther removed from the cooperator. Many cooperators now
assist the authorities in prosecuting criminal activity unrelated to the
offense for which the cooperator was arrested, including criminal
activity in which the cooperator was not involved.
The most extreme example of this disconnect between a
cooperator and his targets is a new species of cooperation called "third-
party cooperation."87 In third-party cooperation, the substantial
assistance is provided not by the defendant seeking the sentencing
reduction, but rather by a third party who wants to help the
defendant. Third-party cooperation is most often used by narcotics
defendants who are incarcerated and therefore unable to actively
assist the authorities.88 Although third-party cooperation has been
83. See, e.g., SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that in another district
defendants "minimally were expected to provide specific information relating to the instant
offense or to another case and agree to testify before the grand jury or at trial").
84. See MAXFIELD & KRAMER, supra note 60, at 10.
85. See id. at 27 n.3.
86. See SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 57. Who actually decides whether a
cooperator's assistance is substantial varies from district to district. Although the substantial
assistance motion invariably originates with the line prosecutor, the motion must be approved by
a supervisor. In some districts, one supervisor's approval is enough. In others, two supervisors or
even a standing "committee" must approve substantial assistance motions. In still others, only
the United States Attorney may approve a substantial assistance motion. See id. at 29.
87. See G. Adam Schweickert, III, Third-Party Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to
Substantial Assistance Departure Jurisprudence, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1449 (1998). Although
third-party cooperation-which is also referred to as "surrogate cooperation"-may not have been
created by the Guidelines, the formal requirements for substantial assistance departures have
made third-party cooperation both more visible and more popular. See Michael S. Ross,
Cooperation with Federal Authorities: Operating on the Outer Limits, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1997,
at 4, 61 ("The notion that a defendant could benefit by someone else's cooperation is almost
radical. But extreme as it is, it has been practiced for many years, though not openly debated.")
88. See Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Cooperation: The Pitfalls and Obligations for
Defense Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2000, at 3, 4.
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controversial,8 9 prosecutors have cautiously embraced it,90 and courts
have generally gone along. 91
In the end, the sentencing reduction that cooperators receive is
significant: on average, cooperators receive a fifty percent reduction of
their sentences. 92
89. Most notably, several defense lawyers have been prosecuted for their roles in lying
about third-party cooperation arrangements. Robert Fierer, an Atlanta defense attorney, pleaded
guilty in 1997 to obstruction of justice in connection with a scheme in which, for a fee, he paired
defendants seeking substantial assistance departures with informants possessing valuable
information, and then encouraged the defendants and informants to lie about the nature of their
relationship. See Schweickert, supra note 87, at 1445, 1461-63. Harvey Baum, a Manhattan
defense attorney, pleaded guilty in 1999 to obstruction of justice for misleading the government
about the relationship between his client and the would-be surrogate cooperator. See United
States v. Baum, 32 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Baum, 691 N.Y.S.2d 455, 455
(1999). Not surprisingly, given defendants' powerful incentives to cooperate, such abuses are not
limited to third-party cooperation. For example, Pat Stiso, another New York City defense
attorney, pleaded guilty in 1998 to obstruction of justice after helping his incarcerated client's
associates set up a phony heroin mill in the hope that his client could then expose the mill and
receive a substantial assistance departure. See Greg B. Smith, Lawyer Led Heroin Hoax for Deal:
Feds, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 4, 1998, at 18; Today's News, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 1998, at 1.
90. See United States v. Baum, 32 F. Supp. 2d. at 644 (describing the policy of one U.S.
Attorney's Office not to agree to third-party cooperation unless: "(1) the third party is a close
relative or a friend of the defendant who is not providing the cooperation for money, and (2) the
defendant has some personal knowledge of the investigated conduct so that he or she can
personally assist in the investigation"); Stanley J. Okula, Jr., Third-Party Cooperation: Proceed
with Caution, CRIM. JUST., SUMMER 1997, at 5, 6-8 (federal prosecutor discussing reasons why
prosecutors should be wary of third-party cooperation). Few statistics exist about the prevalence
of third-party cooperation, although its use appears to be modest. A nationwide survey conducted
by one U.S. Attorney's Office in 1994 revealed eleven cases in which courts had imposed a
reduced sentenced based on third-party cooperation, and three other cases in which prosecutors
had requested the reduced sentence. See United States v. Doe, 870 F. Supp. 702, 704 n.2 (E.D.
Va. 1994); see also Morvillo & Anello, supra note 88, at 4 n.8 (citing the testimony of an Assistant
U.S. Attorney that his office had entered into third-party cooperation agreements on a "handful
of occasions, somewhere fewer than 10 times," during 1996 and 1997).
91. See United States v. Abercrombie, 59 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (holding
that "a defendant may receive the benefit of a... [s]ection 5K1.1 motion due to assistance
rendered in part by third persons"); United States v. Bush, 896 F. Supp. 424, 427-28 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (holding that a defendant may benefit from third-party cooperation if the defendant
"played a material role" in securing the surrogate's assistance); Doe, 870 F. Supp. at 708 (holding
that a substantial assistance departure may be based on third-party cooperation if "(1) the
defendant plays some role in instigating, requesting, providing, or directing the assistance; (2)
the government would not have received the assistance but for the defendant's participation; (3)
the assistance is rendered gratuitously; and (4) the court finds that no other circumstances weigh
against rewarding the assistance").
92. The Sentencing Commission began reporting the average extent of cooperation
departures in 1997. Each year since then, the average sentence reduction for a cooperator has
been approximately fifty percent. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 61 tbl.30; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS 61-62 tbl.30, available at
www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/Sbtoc99.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF
SENTENCING STATISTICS 61 tbl.30, available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/SBTOC98.HTM;
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS 61 tbl.30, available at
www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/SBTOC97.HTM.
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II. THE UTILITARIAN MODEL OF COOPERATION
The cost-benefit analysis that underlies the utilitarian model of
cooperation is as simple as it is compelling. The "cost" is the leniency
given the cooperator; the "benefit" is the additional crime fighting
produced by the cooperation. Prosecutors should use cooperators when
the benefit outweighs the cost, and judges should reward cooperators
with sufficient leniency to ensure that prosecutors can continue to
engage in these socially beneficial transactions.
This utilitarian understanding of cooperation is pervasive. 93
Most notably, it has been implicitly adopted as Department of Justice
policy. As Graham Hughes has observed, the Principles of Federal
Prosecution, which govern federal prosecutors' charging and plea
decisions, "recognize in very general terms the propriety of permitting
the prosecutor to make a utilitarian calculation" in deciding whom to
use as a cooperator. 94 For example, in discussing nonprosecution
agreements-the most extreme form of prosecutorial leniency for
cooperators-the Principles of Federal Prosecution instruct
prosecutors to balance "the cost of foregoing prosecution against the
potential benefit of the person's cooperation" to determine whether
"the cooperation sought appears necessary to the public interest."95
Hughes explains this utilitarian approach as follows:
Under these principles a prosecutor has a duty to neutralize the largest number of units
possible of culpability and dangerousness expressed in behavior that the criminal code
prohibits. As to each potential defendant, the prosecutor must make a difficult
calculation to measure the moral weight of the culpability, including the harm done, and
the future danger to the public. When she can gather no more evidence without
inducements, the prosecutor then decides whether to proceed and prosecute those
suspects against whom the already produced evidence makes a case or whether to
extend leniency or full immunity to some suspects in order to procure testimony against
93. Interestingly, there is little, if any, legislative history reflecting Congress's
understanding of the purpose of the "substantial assistance" provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000). See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 573 n.34 (explaining that
the statutes fostering cooperation were passed with no debate and that the legislative history is
silent as to the rationale for the "substantial assistance" provisions).
94. Hughes, supra note 4, at 14. First promulgated in 1980 and amended regularly
thereafter, the Principles of Prosecution set forth general guidelines "intended to promote the
reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion." See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Principles of Federal
Prosecution, in U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.110 (1997).
95. See Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 94, § 9-27.600(B)(3). The provision
governing section 5KI.1 cooperation agreements provides similar (though less detailed)
guidance, instructing prosecutors to consider "the nature and value of the cooperation offered
and whether the same benefit can be obtained without having to make the charge or sentence
concession that would be involved in a plea agreement." Id. § 9-27.420(B)(1).
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other, more dangerous suspects against whom existing evidence is flimsy or
nonexistent.
96
The utilitarian approach also permeates the ways that
prosecutors talk about cooperation. For example, Frank Bowman, a
former federal prosecutor and former Special Counsel to the
Sentencing Commission, has described the principle behind the
substantial assistance departure as follows:
Section 5K1.1 differs in a crucial respect from virtually every other guideline. It was
designed, not to ensure that criminals are punished for what they truly did or to achieve
sentencing equity among similarly situated offenders, but as a tool to fight crime....
[I]ts consciously utilitarian justification is that society is willing to pay the price of
giving sentence reductions to morally undeserving cooperators in exchange for the
benefit of an increased likelihood of apprehending and convicting criminals who might
not otherwise be caught.9 7
The prosecutor's utilitarian approach to cooperation has been
recognized and implicitly approved by the Supreme Court. In Wade v.
United States,98 in upholding section 5K1.1's government motion
requirement, the Court noted that the government may refuse to move
for a substantial assistance departure simply based on "its rational
assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving. 99
Perhaps the most fully developed utilitarian model of
cooperation was developed by Ian Weinstein. 100 In Weinstein's
explicitly economic analysis, the Guidelines have created a "market"
for cooperation. Defendants are the "suppliers"; their "commodity" is
their cooperation. Prosecutors are the "buyers"; their currency is
5K1.1 departure motions. 101
According to this utilitarian model, cooperation is problematic
in several ways. First, and most obviously, because the cooperator's
96. Hughes, supra note 4, at 14.
97. Frank 0. Bowman III, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old Prosecutor's
Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer Report, 12 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 45, 47-48 (1999); see also Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1117
(2001) ("Substantial assistance departures exist based on the hardheaded utilitarian calculation
that offering sentence reductions in return for testimony is sometimes necessary to detect and
successfully prosecute certain crimes."); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs
and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 292, 292-94
(1996) (providing a former federal prosecutor's thoughts on the "necessary evil" of cooperators).
98. 504 U.S. 181, 187 (1992).
99. Id.
100. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 569-600.
101. See id.; see also United States v. Bush, 896 F. Supp. 424, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating
that "there exists a ready market for substantial assistance, even if the parties don't trade in
dollars"); Hughes, supra note 4, at 15 (stating that "[tihe thrifty prosecutor will buy cooperation
at the lowest price"); Schweickert, supra note 87, at 1468 (arguing that substantial assistance
departures are "based upon the fundamentals of capitalist theory").
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sentencing discount is undeserved, the resulting sentence offends the
retributive premise of punishment. Although retributivism's
philosophical foundations may be the subject of some disagreement, 102
the basic "just deserts" principle of retributivism is simple. Andrew
von Hirsch10 3 calls it the "principle of proportionality: [S]entences
should be proportionate in their severity to the seriousness of the
criminal conduct."10 4 Undeserved leniency-what von Hirsch calls
"[d]isproportionate leniency"105-thus offends retributivism's core
premise of proportionality.
Criminal law theorists, of course, still debate the relative
merits of retributivism and utilitarianism.10 6 Nevertheless, "just
deserts" has become so deeply embedded in American sentencing that
making "the punishment fit the crime" has become a clich6. 10 7 And
although the Sentencing Commission famously refused to adopt one or
102. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17-18 (3d ed. 2001)
(describing different variations of retributive theory); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1284-85 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (same).
103. Von Hirsch's influential book Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (1976) is
generally credited with "launching the 'just deserts' movement" into mainstream penological
theory. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1840 n.165; see also Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781, 784 (1976) ("New respect
is being paid to retribution as a central factor in just and coherent punishment systems.");
Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2000) (crediting Andrew von Hirsch's Doing Justice: The Choice of
Punishments with gaining "a wide audience for neo-retributive criminal justice philosophy"). Von
Hirsch's book also spurred a sentencing guidelines movement. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced
and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 33 & n.40 (2000).
104. See Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, Introduction to Desert, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING 181, 182 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); see also VON HIRSCH,
supra note 103, at 66-76. In von Hirsch's view, the "seriousness" of a criminal act includes both
"the harm done (or risked) by the act and... the degree of the actor's culpability." VON HIRSCH,
supra note 103, at 69.
105. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 104, at 198.
106. See generally Herbert Morris, Concluding Remarks: The Future of Punishment, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1927, 1930 (1999) (discussing the "apparently intractable differences" between
retributive and utilitarian theorists). Compare MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW passim (1997) (defending retributivism), with David Dolinko,
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 passim (1992) (criticizing retributive
theory). Even retributivism's harshest critics, however, recognize retributive theory's
"ascendancy" in the past three decades. See Dolinko, supra, at 1623 ("It is widely acknowledged
that retributivism, once treated as an irrational vestige of benighted times, has enjoyed in recent
years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading philosophical
justification of the institution of criminal punishment.").
107. See Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCIA L. REV. 1873, 1880 (1999) ("Kant's
theory has been so influential that a colloquial expression of it, that the punishment should 'fit'
the crime, is a commonplace for anybody who has ever witnessed a prosecutor's sentencing
allocution or seen one depicted on television.").
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the other theory of punishment, 108 it did explicitly adopt a version of
proportionality as a key component of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Under the Guidelines' version of proportionality-often called
"uniformity"-defendants who commit similar offenses (and who have
similar criminal histories) should receive similar sentences.10 9
Sentencing discounts for cooperators, by definition, offend this
commitment to uniformity.11 0
Under the utilitarian model, cooperation discounts also offend
the traditional utilitarian justifications for punishment.' While
society may benefit from the additional crime fighting produced by the
cooperator, that benefit may be offset by a decreased level of general
deterrence. It is true that cooperation in general may deter some
future crime by destabilizing criminal conspiracies even before any of
the conspirators begins cooperating." 2 But it is entirely possible that
this destabilizing effect is outweighed by the counterdeterrent
message of cooperation discounts: You can escape serious punishment
for your crime so long as you have someone to rat on.113 This counter-
deterrent effect may be exacerbated by the likelihood that prosecutors
overvalue cooperation's direct effects (additional arrests and
convictions) and undervalue cooperation's indirect effects (less general
108. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 39, at 16 (discussing purposes of sentencing-
"just deserts" and "crime control"--and explaining the Commission's refusal "to choose between
them or to accord one primacy over the other" in drafting the Sentencing Guidelines); Marc
Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 437-50 (1992) (criticizing the Sentencing
Commission for creating and encouraging a purposeless sentencing system).
109. "Uniformity" and "proportionality" were two of the three "objectives" that the
Sentencing Commission ascribed to Congress in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act: "Second,
Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders. Third, Congress
sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity." 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, ch. 1, pt.
A(3) (explaining that the third objective was "honesty in sentencing").
110. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the
State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 341-44 (2000); Weinstein,
supra note 3, at 611-17.
111. See DRESSLER, supra note 102, at 15 (describing the goals of utilitarianism as general
deterrence, specific deterrence (including incapacitation and intimidation), and rehabilitation);
Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 1286-88 (describing the utilitarian justifications of punishment
as general deterrence, norm reinforcement, individual deterrence, incapacitation, reform,
vengeance, and victim restoration).
112. See Richman, supra note 97, at 293 ("The lure of deep sentencing discounts may even
destabilize a criminal conspiracy before the government initiates a formal prosecution; such is
the information-forcing power of the Prisoner's Dilemma.").
113. See id. ("One must wonder at the damage done to the force of our laws, however, when
murderers 'walk' because they were fortunate enough to have others to 'rat' on.").
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deterrence).114 Similarly, under the utilitarian model of cooperation,
the individual cooperator may receive a sentence that is insufficient to
prevent him from committing future crimes-whether by specifically
deterring him, incapacitating him, or rehabilitating him. 1 5
These criticisms of cooperation flow directly from the standard
utilitarian model. And while the criticisms have some validity,116 they
tend to be overstated, in part because the utilitarian model presents
an incomplete picture of cooperation. The more complex conception of
cooperation posits that the cooperator receives a sentencing discount
not simply as payment for providing the government with a crime-
fighting benefit, but also because he deserves it (at least in part).
When cooperation discounts are viewed in this light, many of the
problems noted above dissipate if not disappear.
III. COOPERATION AS PUNISHMENT: OSTRACISM AND ALIENATION
The social meaning of cooperation is best captured by the
words used to describe cooperators, with "rat" being perhaps the most
evocative.11 7 As one court has noted, with some understatement:
"Many view a cooperating witness as a betrayer or informer;
unquestionably, such a person is not generally held in high regard."" 8
Other commentators have been more blunt, noting, for example, that
114. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 565 ("The current market for snitches cannot optimize
the use of cooperation because these decision-makers internalize the benefits and externalize
(and so largely ignore) the costs.").
115. See Richman, supra note 97, at 292.
116. An additional criticism of cooperation-and one beyond the scope of this Article-is that
cooperation encourages perjury. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 61 (examining, through
interviews with former prosecutors, the extent to which cooperators lie and the ability of
prosecutors to detect those lies). There is no doubt that an incentive to cooperate is also a
temptation to lie. Under the current Guidelines system, a defendant's incentives to cooperate are
so great that the temptation to lie (or to embellish) may be irresistible. This criticism, powerful
though it is, is not unique to the utilitarian view of cooperation. Under any theory of cooperation,
cooperator perjury will remain a risk-and one that can be avoided only by skeptical prosecutors
who are willing to take the time and make the effort to rigorously corroborate their cooperators.
See id. at 934-40 (discussing "insufficient corroboration" as a major reason for prosecutors' false
beliefs in cooperator truthfulness); Trott, supra note 62, at 1405-09 (discussing ways in which
prosecutors can test cooperators' stories).
117. See CHRISTINE AMMER, COOL CATS, TOP DOGS, AND OTHER BEASTLY EXPRESSIONS 136-
38 (1999) ("[R]ats are hated and feared, and calling someone a rat has been an insult for
centuries. At best you are calling the person a scoundrel, and at worst, a deserter, an informer,
or simply a despicable individual."); SKOLNICK, supra note 5, at 126 ("In our culture, as is
evidenced by the children's terms tattletale and snitch as well as by the underworld's fink and
stoolie, informants are objects of contempt and derision.").
118. United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 785 (2d Cir. 1996).
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cooperators are generally viewed with "aversion and nauseous
disdain." 119
This disdain for cooperators is deeply embedded in our culture.
In the playground, our children learn that no one likes a tattletale. In
school, they learn that Benedict Arnold was despised for his treason.
In church, they learn that Judas's treachery led to Jesus's death. And
these lessons are continually reinforced by portrayals of the snitch and
the rat in movies, in literature, and in popular culture. 120
Much of our antipathy for the cooperator is rooted in his
disloyalty. Loyalty is a virtue. Indeed, George Fletcher has argued
that loyalty-tempered with what he calls "impartial morality"-is
one of the primary virtues by which we live our lives. 121 The
cooperator, almost by definition, is disloyal. The cooperator's targets,
in many cases, are the very people with whom he is closest.' 22 By
"signing up" with the prosecution, the cooperator betrays those people,
and, as Fletcher has argued, "[b]etrayal ... is one of the basic sins of
our civilization."'123
Fletcher's core examples of betrayal-adultery, idolatry, and
treason-no doubt differ from cooperation. After all, the cooperator
does not betray a devoted lover, a benevolent god, or a beloved
119. Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951). More recently, Dan Richman (a former federal
prosecutor) and Ian Weinstein (a former federal defender) have each noted the "disdain" reserved
for cooperating witnesses. See Richman, supra note 5, at 69 n.*, 79-84; Weinstein, supra note 3,
at 563 n.*, 621-24.
120. See Richman, supra note 5, at 83-84. Although Jimmy Cagney never said, "You dirty
rat," see JAMES CAGNEY, CAGNEY BY CAGNEY 74 (1976), the continuing resonance of that fictional
line is a telling testament to public aversion to informers. In Liam O'Flaherty's novel, The
Informer, which became an Academy Award-winning film by John Ford, the title character
betrays a comrade for a twenty-pound reward and instantly becomes, both in his own mind and
in his community, an "outcast." LIAM O'FLAHERTY, THE INFORMER 22 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich 1980) (1925); see also Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of
Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 635 (1984) (comparing the title character in the film version of
The Informer to "the arch-betrayer Judas").
121. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 151-75
(1993); see also Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 534 (1986)
(arguing that the "general disapproval of informers" has a moral basis).
122. As Dan Richman has noted, "the defendant with personal knowledge of the misdeeds of
someone else will generally-though not invariably-have obtained it by virtue of having a
relationship of trust with that person ... [and] [h]e can be expected to have some loyalty to the
'target' against whom he can cooperate." See Richman, supra note 5, at 78.
123. FLETCHER, supra note 121, at 10. Fletcher notes:
The worst epithets are reserved for the sin of betrayal. Worse than murder, worse
than incest, betrayal of country invites universal scorn. Betrayal of a lover is regarded
by many as an irremediable breach. For the religious, betrayal of God is the supreme
vice. The specific forms of betrayal-adultery, treason, and idolatry-all reek with
evil.
Id. at 41.
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country. Instead, the cooperator switches his loyalties from a group of
criminals to the state. Where, one might ask, is the sin in that?
124
The answer lies in the cooperator's motives. The typical
cooperator does not betray his associates out of an altruistic desire to
fight crime. The typical cooperator is motivated primarily, if not
entirely, by a desire to help himself.125 In this respect, the cooperator
is unlike a normal witness who may come forward with evidence out of
a sense of civic obligation. Nor is the cooperator like a witness whose
testimony might "betray" the target but whose motives are not selfish.
A betrayal that is not motivated by self-interest simply does not carry
the same stigma as the "sin" condemned by Fletcher. So, for example,
when a witness turns in a family member not for personal gain but
rather out of a sense of civic obligation, the act is likely to be seen as
heroic (or tragic), but not evil.1 26
The cooperator, on the other hand, is more like Benedict
Arnold, betraying his country for the promise of £20,000,127 or like
Judas, betraying his Messiah for thirty silver pieces.1 28 That the
cooperator is paid in leniency rather than money does not change the
moral calculus. It is his selfishness-his willingness to betray others
124. Indeed, Fletcher recognizes that one of the situations in which "impartial morality"
should prevail is when loyalty becomes "complicity in a crime." Id. at 170-71.
125. See Richman, supra note 5, at 82 ("The assumption that defendants' reasons for
cooperating are exclusively selfish seems reasonable enough .. "); Weinstein, supra note 3, at
624 (The cooperator "is motivated by a desire for a personal benefit, not some greater good.").
126. The arrest of the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, on information provided by his
brother David comes to mind. See Stephen J. Dubner, "I Don't Want to Live Long. I Would Rather
Get the Death Penalty than Spend the Rest of My Life in Prison," TIME, Oct. 18, 1999, at 44
(noting that "[aifter Ted's arrest, David was instantly lauded as a sort of moral superhero for
sacrificing his beloved if troubled brother"); Lawyers Group Honors Brother of Unabomber,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 7, 1999, at A21 (reporting that the New York State Bar
Association awarded David Kaczynski its highest justice award for a nonlawyer). Fletcher cites
the example of the film Music Box, in which the protagonist eventually decides to turn in her
father for Nazi atrocities. See FLETCHER, supra note 121, at 152-53.
127. See CLARE BRANDT, THE MAN IN THE MIRROR: A LIFE OF BENEDICT ARNOLD 195, 208
(1994). Because Arnold's plot to deliver West Point to the British failed, he was ultimately paid
only £6,000. See id. at 230. One history book argues that Arnold's infamy is rooted not simply in
his "transfer of allegiance to the British side-for other Patriots chose to become loyalists," but
rather in his willingness to betray the American war effort for personal gain. JAMES A.
HENRETTA ET AL., AMERICA'S HISTORY 197 (4th ed. 2000). "His treachery was not that of a
principled man but that of a selfish one, and he never lived that down." Id.
128. See Matthew 26:14-16. Even the "tattletale" is defined by selfishness. In teaching our
children about tattling, we hope that they learn to distinguish between tattling simply to get
someone else in trouble ("Daddy, Johnny stuck his tongue out at me.") and "telling on" someone
to prevent a greater harm ("Daddy, Johnny is lighting the curtains on fire."). See Jack B.
Weinstein, The Informer: Hero or Villain? Ethical and Legal Problems, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at
1, 4 (criticizing the "failure to make distinctions between a toady tattling about somebody who
throws a spitball and a responsible citizen alerting the authorities about the existence of a
dangerous member of the community").
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for personal gain-that accounts for the disdain in which he is held, 129
even if the disdainers recognize that society benefits from his
efforts. 130
The common contempt for rats carries significant practical
consequences for the cooperator. 131 Most obviously, the cooperator is
ostracized from his criminal cohorts. Organized criminal groups-such
as gangs or the Mafia-are often viewed as "families,"' 32 and even less
organized groups usually comprise close friends. 133 For the cooperator
excluded from the group, the separation can be painful. More
concretely, the cooperator loses whatever benefits (legitimate or
illegitimate) that membership in the group carried. Most ominously,
the cooperator and his family may be exposed to physical retaliation
by former associates.134
The cooperator's ostracism may also extend well beyond his
immediate associates. At a minimum, the cooperator will be ostracized
from the broader community of criminals that he may encounter, both
in and out of prison. In prison, the cooperator will be exposed to the
continual threat of physical retaliation, even from prisoners
129. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 624; Weinstein, supra note 128, at 1, 4 (suggesting that the
answer to the title question-The Informer: Hero or Villain?-lies in the informer's motives). Dan
Richman has argued that antipathy for the cooperator stems as much from the betrayal itself as
from its selfish motivation. See Richman, supra note 5, at 83-84. While I agree with Richman
that our culture values "loyalty for its own sake," id. at 84, even Fletcher concedes that loyalty
must sometimes yield to the ethic of "impartial morality." FLETCHER, supra note 121, at 164-65.
In evaluating a particular actor's resolution of the "quandary" presented when loyalty conflicts
with impartial morality, it is hard not to look primarily to the actor's motives.
130. See Richman, supra note 5, at 80-81 ("A utilitarian calculus would applaud, or at least
encourage, the snitch, regardless of his motivations or personal allegiances.").
131. See Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 926 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that
cooperators are subject to "criticism, public harassment, social ostracism, [and] even physical
injury"); Richman, supra note 5, at 72 (noting that snitches "face economic or physical retaliation
and social ostracism").
132. See, e.g., Frank E. Harper, To Kill the Messenger: The Deflection of Responsibility
Through Scapegoating (A Socio-Legal Analysis of Parental Responsibility Laws and the Urban
Gang Family), 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 41, 49 (1991) ("For many gang members their gang
membership serves those purposes perceived to be inherent to a 'normally' functioning family.").
133. See Richman, supra note 5, at 78-79.
134. See id. at 79; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 3-7 (1985). In their book,
BLACK MASS: THE IRISH MOB, THE FBI, AND A DEVIL'S DEAL (2000), Dick Lehr and Gerard O'Neill
not only describe the murder of an underworld cooperator, but also report a mobster's wiretapped
rant against "rats." Id. After comparing rats (unfavorably) to rapists and child molesters, the
mobster recounts in profane and gruesome detail his preferred method for dismembering a rat.
Id. Cases in which defendants killed or threatened to kill cooperators are legion and are not
limited to organized crime defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 643-46
(2d Cir. 2001) (describing the murder and attempted murder of cooperating witnesses).
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completely unconnected with the cooperator. 135 Outside of prison, the
cooperator may find himself excluded from the community through
which he earned his illicit livelihood.
Indeed, the collective aversion to rats runs so deep that the
cooperator will likely find himself ostracized even from law-abiding
communities to which he belongs. 3 6 Economically, the cooperator may
find himself excluded from (or not trusted in) his business
community. 137 Socially, the cooperator may find himself an outcast in
his neighborhood or in his ethnic or religious community, particularly
communities with a history of official persecution.1 38 The Irish, for
example, have long harbored a particular hatred for informers. 139 For
orthodox Jews, the aversion to informants has become a religious
prescription against testifying against other Jews. 140 Ironically, police
officers, with their "blue wall of silence,"'141 may be the most hostile to
135. See United States v. Vaulin, 132 F.3d 898, 900 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting the "prison code
that requires inmates to be antagonistic to any inmate who cooperates with the Government in
criminal prosecutions").
136. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 5, at 79-80 (discussing the "social cost of cooperating").
137. See id. at 79; see also KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT
OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 172 (1985) (noting "the sanctions of the marketplace that often follow a
person's providing incriminating information against business associates"); Stanley S. Arkin,
Moral Issues and the Cooperating Witness, N.Y. L.J., June 9, 1994, at 3, 7 ("Any
businessman/informer must consider whether he will be able to continue to pursue his trade once
he fulfills his role as informant.").
138. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 1, at 4 ("Many Americans of today have a sort of
atavistic hatred of the informer derived from a grandfather who evaded the 'Black and Tans' in
Ireland or the Kaiser's conscriptors in Germany. Today, of course, there is another generation of
newly arrived Americans who have a more recent and poignant recollection of the distress
occasioned by an informer against them.").
139. As Billy Bulger, long-time president of the Massachusetts State Senate and brother of
the notorious gangster Whitey Bulger, once described the ethic of heavily Irish South Boston:
"[W]e loathed informers. It wasn't a conspiratorial thing--our folklore bled with the names of
informers who had sold out their brethren to hangmen and worse in the lands of our ancestors."
WILLIAM M. BULGER, WHILE THE MUSIC LASTS: MY LIFE IN POLITICS 4 (1996); see also Richman,
supra note 5, at 84 ("The treatment of [the title character] in The Informer only begins to convey
the hatred that those of Irish ancestry have for his ilk.").
140. See Joel Cohen, Informers: Does American Law Violate the Talmud's Precepts?, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 29, 1991, at 1, 4 n.5 (quoting, among other authorities, one rabbinical interpretation of
the Talmud: "It is then clear from Jewish legal rulings that according to Jewish law it is
forbidden to be an informer and that informers are permitted to be executed, and that they are
punished in hell and have no share in the world to come."); see also Richman, supra note 5, at 84
n.58 (citing cases in which Jewish witnesses refusing to testify in criminal proceedings have
(unsuccessfully) tried to rely on the Talmudic prohibition against testifying against another
Jew); Weinstein, supra note 128, at 1 (noting that "informing was something an orthodox Jew
would not do," based in part on "Jewish law indicating the disdain and horror in which Jews had
held informers over the centuries, going back to Roman times").
141. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998)
(describing the "blue wall of silence" as "an unwritten code in many departments which prohibits
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cooperators. 142 Some cooperators may find themselves rejected even by
their own families. 143
Finally, the cooperator may find himself not only alienated
from his community, but also ill at ease with himself. As Keri Gould
has suggested, a system that coerces defendants into engaging in
conduct that is "at odds with their own moral code," may leave
cooperators (both literally and figuratively) "demoralized."' 144
The extent of the hardship imposed by cooperation will, of
course, vary from defendant to defendant. Most obviously, the
defendant whose cooperation creates a significant risk of retaliation
will suffer more than the defendant whose cooperation is relatively
riskless. More subtly but just as significantly, the defendant who
cooperates against his close friends, is ostracized from his
community, 145 and loses his livelihood will suffer more than the
defendant who cooperates against strangers and whose "betrayal" goes
unnoticed by his community.
It might be tempting in this context to discount the hardship
suffered by a cooperator who is excluded from a criminal gang or from
a group of friends engaged in some illicit enterprise. Undoubtedly, the
cooperator's exclusion from that group leaves society in a better
position. But the cooperator's suffering may be acute nevertheless. In
my experiences with cooperators in street-level narcotics cases, their
inability to go back to the "corner" on which they hung out oftentimes
left them feeling as if they had nothing to go back to at all. The very
narrowness of their world and its horizons left them particularly
susceptible to the hardships of being labeled a "rat."
The collateral hardships imposed by cooperation effectively
impose extra punishment on the cooperating defendant-punishment
over and above that suffered by defendants who do not cooperate. The
disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts
would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer").
142. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 1, at 64-65; Richman, supra note 5, at 80 n.44 (noting
that police officers' general disdain for snitches "may reflect their antipathy for cooperators from
within their ranks").
143. See United States v. Baker, 4 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the defendant
who had cooperated was subject to " 'ostracism' and 'suspicion' within her extended family");
United States v. Vento, 700 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that the defendant's
"cooperation had led to his being completely ostracized by his family").
144. Gould, supra note 3, at 873; see also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 624 (questioning "the
moral lesson we teach individual cooperators").
145. By "community," I mean more than just geographic communities. I mean any
community-geographic, commercial, ethnic, religious, familial, or whatever-to which the
cooperator belongs and cares about. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, ACM 32236, 1997 CCA
LEXIS 127, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 1997) (describing a witness as being "ostracized
from the ham radio community for being a 'rat' ").
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theorist may object that "punishment" only includes those sanctions
specifically imposed by the state as a result of a criminal conviction.
Henry Hart, for example, argued that the hardships imposed on a
convicted defendant "take their character as punishment from the
condemnation which precedes them [i.e., the conviction] and serves as
the warrant for their infliction."146 While the cooperator's ostracism
may not be imposed by the state, it certainly flows in part from the
"condemnation" inherent in the cooperator's conviction. Moreover, the
cooperator's extralegal punishment differs from that suffered by other
defendants because the cooperator is ostracized not simply for his
criminal conduct but also (indeed, primarily) for his subsequent
decision to become a rat.147
More importantly, theory aside, sentencing judges have long
considered the "collateral consequences" of a criminal conviction and
sentence when imposing sentence. 148 Thus, even if such collateral
consequences are not technically "punishment," they have
traditionally been treated as mitigating factors that lessen the amount
of punishment that must be imposed by the state to give the defendant
his "just deserts.."149 And because cooperation often imposes significant
146. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958). Joshua Dressler has summed up the conventional definition of "punishment" as
follows:
Criminal law scholars have generally concluded ... that D may be said to suffer
"punishment" when, but only when, an agent of the Government, pursuant to
authority granted to the agent by virtue of D's criminal conviction, intentionally
inflicts pain on D or otherwise causes D to suffer some consequence that is ordinarily
considered to be unpleasant .... [P]enalties imposed outside the criminal justice
system, such as disbarment of a lawyer by the licensing authority or the actions of a
lynch mob, although painful or unpleasant, do not constitute "punishment."
DRESSLER, supra note 102, at 12 (citation omitted).
147. Indeed, while the state does not impose the social ostracism suffered by the rat, it
certainly does impose the often irresistible pressures to cooperate.
148. Jeffrie Murphy has defended consideration of such collateral consequences from a
theoretical perspective:
We normally expect the proper amount of suffering to be administered by the state
through legal punishment. However, if there is reason to believe that the individual
has already experienced a significant amount of relevant suffering through nonlegal
channels, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the suffering he experience at the
hands of the state be reduced to that degree-perhaps eliminated entirely in those
cases where we are inclined to say "he has suffered enough."
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 143, 157 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997).
149. In their influential study of pre-Guidelines sentencing of white-collar offenders,
Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat found numerous judges who believed that defendants who have
suffered collateral consequences-such as loss of a job, revocation of a license, or diminishment of
status in the community-deserve less additional punishment. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note
27, at 144-51. With the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, the appropriateness of "collateral
consequences" as grounds for downward departure has been frequently litigated. See, e.g., Koon
v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 89 (1996) (reviewing district court's downward departure on
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collateral consequences, many cooperators simply deserve less
additional punishment. 150
IV. COOPERATION AS ATONEMENT: REMORSE AND EXPIATION
Ostracism notwithstanding, cooperation's effects on the
cooperator are not all negative. Indeed, one of the clearest
shortcomings of the utilitarian model is that it ignores the ways in
which cooperation itself helps the cooperator. For many cooperators,
ostracism from criminal communities will be accompanied by
reconciliation with law-abiding communities. For example, the
cooperator who is ostracized both from his gang and from gang life in
general may ultimately reconcile with his family, his church, or other
law-abiding segments of his community. This reconciliation is part of
the second part of the reconceptualization of cooperation: cooperation
as atonement.
A. The Theory of Atonement
Stephen Garvey has articulated a theory of criminal
punishment based on a model of atonement. 15 1 Garvey's argument is
that, in an ideal community, punishment would not be imposed simply
because the offender "deserved" it or simply to prevent future crime.
Rather, punishment would be one part of a process by which the
grounds that defendants were " 'particularly likely to be targets of abuse in prison' " and were
likely to "lose their positions as police officers" and "be disqualified from prospective employment
in the field of law enforcement"). Under the peculiar structure of the Sentencing Guidelines,
much of the litigation surrounds whether the collateral consequences are sufficiently unusual to
remove the particular case from the "heartland" of the offense. See id. at 113 (approving, on the
particular facts in that case, the departure for abuse in prison, but not the departure for loss of
employment opportunities); United States v. Drew, 131 F.3d 1269, 1270 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that "the Guidelines do not forbid the use of career loss or disqualification as a departure
factor"). There is little disagreement, however, that such collateral consequences are appropriate
mitigating sentencing factors, to the extent that sentencing judges have discretion with the
Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring) (approving, in principle, a downward departure based on the additional punishment
defendant would suffer from the burden and humiliation of later public proceedings, but
remanding for further factual findings), opinion withdrawn, 11 F.3d 124 (9th Cir. 1993), on
rehearing en banc, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing conviction), affd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (reinstating conviction), on remand, 80 F.3d 329 (9th
Cir. 1996) (remanding to district court for further proceedings without addressing the sentencing
issue).
150. I do not contend that the ostracism suffered by a cooperator is necessarily bad. Indeed,
the ostracism suffered by the cooperator, while unpleasant for the cooperator, may often bring a
net social benefit. In particular, ostracism from criminal communities will diminish the
cooperator's opportunities and temptations to engage in criminal conduct.
151. See Garvey, supra note 8, passim.
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offender atones for his wrongs and is reconciled with his
community. 152 Garvey's theory is explicitly idealized and admittedly
abstract. But, as Garvey suggests, it carries "lessons for many of our
institutions and practices of punishment"153-including the use and
sentencing of cooperators.
Garvey's theory also draws on theological understandings of
atonement.154 Atonement has obvious religious resonance, and our
fullest and most forceful explanations of atonement have come from
theologians. 155 While Garvey's approach is secular, he embraces
atonement's religious roots. 15 6 Garvey simply shifts the focus from a
reconciliation with God to a reconciliation with community. 57
Under Garvey's model, atonement has two basic stages:
expiation (the process by which the wrongdoer atones for his wrong)
and reconciliation (the process by which the victim forgives the
wrongdoer and completes the wrongdoer's reconciliation with the
community).'58 Expiation itself has four steps: repentance, apology,
reparation, and penance. 159
Repentance-The first step toward atonement is for the
wrongdoer to repent, to feel remorse for his wrongdoing. 60 As Jeffrie
Murphy has explained it:
152. See id. at 1804-06. Garvey describes his atonement model as neither retributive nor
utilitarian-atonement is an end in itself. Id. Nevertheless, the theory incorporates aspects of
both retributivism and utilitarianism. Id. From the retributive perspective, the defendant who
has atoned for his wrongs deserves less punishment. Id. From the utilitarian perspective, the
defendant who has atoned is less likely to offend again. Id.
153. Id. at 1804.
154. See id. at 1806-10.
155. Garvey cites the work of St. Paul, St. Abailard, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, and
John Calvin. See id. at 1808-09. For a detailed comparison of Garvey's theory of atonement with
atonement in Jewish thought and tradition, see Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at
Repentance, Forgiveness and Atonement in Jewish Law and Philosophy and American Legal
Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677 (2000). The approach that other religious traditions take
to atonement (or to its close cousin repentance), is explored in a series of essays in REPENTANCE:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 148. See Mahmoud Ayoub, Repentance in the Islamic
Tradition, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 148, at 96-121; Guy L.
Beck, Fire in the Atman: Repentance in Hinduism, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 148, at 76-95; Malcolm David Eckel, A Buddhist Approach to
Repentance, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 148, at 122-42.
156. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1802.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1804.
159. Id. In his division of atonement into expiation and reconciliation, Garvey follows the
moral philosopher and Christian theologian Richard Swinburne. RICHARD SWINBURNE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT 81 (1989) ("For perfect removal of guilt, then, the wrongdoer
must make atonement for his wrong act, and the victim must forgive him.").
160. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1814-15.
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Repentance is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrongful and
harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one's character that generated the
actions, the resolve to do one's best to extirpate those aspects of one's character, and the
resolve to atone or make amends for the [wrong and] harm that one has done.16 1
Remorse begins-but does not end-with a felt sense of guilt.162 In an
ideal community, the wrongdoer will identify with the victim, and the
pain inflicted on the victim will, in the wrongdoer, become the self-
directed anger that is guilt. Remorse takes guilt one step further.
Where guilt is passive and self-centered, remorse is active and other-
centered.163  The remorseful (as opposed to the merely guilty)
wrongdoer will seek to atone for his wrong. 164
Apology-Apology makes the wrongdoer's remorse public in a
way that is both ritualistic and substantive. Apology is "the
wrongdoer's public expression of his repentance, whereby he openly
acknowledges his wrongdoing and simultaneously disowns it. ' '165
Unlike an excuse, an apology does not deny responsibility for the
wrong. It acknowledges the wrong but disavows the wrongdoer. 166
Reparation-Reparation involves repairing the material harm
done to the victim through restitution or compensation. 67 Garvey
separates the consequences of an offense into the "material harm"
done to the victim and the "moral wrong" done to him. 6s Reparation is
designed, quite practically, to repair the material harm. 69 Reparation
does not, however, rectify the offender's moral wrong. 70 For that, he
must undergo penance. 171
161. Id. (quoting Murphy, supra note 148, at 147) (interpolation in original).
162. Id. at 1814.
163. Id. at 1816.
164. See id. at 1822-23; Levine, supra note 155, at 1683.
165. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1815.
166. See id. at 1816; Levine, supra note 155, at 1685-86.
167. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1816.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1818.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1816-18; Levine, supra note 155, at 1688. For a similar division of "material
harm" and "moral wrong" in the context of a retributive theory, see R.A. Duff, In Defence of One
Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 411, 413
(2000). Duff argues that punishment "should be justified as an exercise in moral communication
which aims to bring offenders to face up to and repent their crimes, to reform themselves, and to
make appropriate reparation to and seek reconciliation with those whom they wronged." Id. at
412. Duff distinguishes between "material reparation" (which may not always be possible or
needed) and "moral reparation" (which is always required for reconciliation). Id. at 413. In Duff's
view, "apology" is so "[clentral to such moral reparation... [that] the punishment the offender is
required to undertake can be seen in part as a symbolic public apology that he is required to
make." Id.
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Penance-Penance is "self-imposed hardship or suffering" that
repairs the moral harm the wrongdoer has inflicted on the victim. 172
As a form of punishment, penance is critical to Garvey's theory
because it is the logical and moral conclusion of the process that
begins with the wrongdoer's feelings of guilt.'73 Crime does not only
inflict material harm on the victim, it also inflicts a moral harm by
degrading, demeaning, diminishing, and dishonoring the victim. 17 4
Punishment also sends a message: one of "condemnation, censure, and
vindication." '75 As Garvey explains it, "Punishment is thus our way of
censuring or condemning the wrongdoer's wrong, of annulling the
false message he implicitly conveys through his wrongdoing, and of
vindicating the moral value and standing of his victim." 176 In the ideal
community, the remorseful offender who identifies with his victim
"will experience anger and resentment toward himself, just as his
victim feels resentment and anger toward him."1 77 Thus, "just as his
victim's moral worth cannot be restored unless the wrongdoer is
punished, so too the wrongdoer cannot restore his own moral standing
unless he submits to punishment."' 178
The second stage of Garvey's theory of atonement involves
reconciliation: the process by which the victim forgives the wrongdoer
(after the wrongdoer has undergone expiation). 7 9 The ensuing
reconciliation between wrongdoer and victim completes the
wrongdoer's reconciliation with the community and signals the
victim's awareness that the debt owed to him by the wrongdoer-both
the material debt and the moral debt-has been repaid. 180
172. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1819.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 1821.
175. Id. at 1820.
176. Id. at 1821.
177. Id. at 1822.
178. Id. at 1823; see also Levine, supra note 155, at 1689. This view of punishment as
necessary for atonement has roots in, among other traditions, Jewish law. As Sam Levine has
pointed out, one of the functions of capital punishment in the Biblical justice system "was to
provide a means for the offender to atone for the capital offense." Samuel J. Levine, Capital
Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual
Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1042 (1998). Indeed, in the Jewish system a death sentence
included a "mandatory" confession to facilitate the offender's repentance and atonement. See id.
at 1043 n.22.
179. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1829.
180. See id. at 1827-28; Levine, supra note 155, at 1691-92. Garvey contrasts his theory with
four other theories of punishment: utilitarianism, retributivism, restorativism, and
libertarianism. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1830-46. Both utilitarianism and retributivism give
us, in Garvey's view, "punishment without atonement"-utilitarianism because it "cares little
about community and the role of punishment in sustaining community," id. at 1830-31 (arguing
that "[t]raditional utilitarianism is a good philosophy of punishment, but only for a 'community'
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How does all this work in practice? In an ideal world, a
wrongdoer would feel remorse, publicly apologize to his victim,
compensate the victim for any material harm, and submit to such
punishment as is necessary to vindicate the moral wrong inflicted on
the victim. Upon completion of this expiation, the victim would forgive
the wrongdoer, who would then be fully reconciled with and
reintegrated into society.
Perhaps the most pressing practical question is how much
punishment is required for an effective penance. As Garvey outlines it,
three principles underlie the atonement model's answer to this
question. First, like retributivism, atonement requires that the
"penance assigned to the wrongdoer" be "proportional to the offender's
wrongdoing and culpability."181 Second, because "penance is directed
at the wrong the offender has done, not the harm he has caused,"
punishment under the atonement model, unlike some retributive
models, "keeps the harm caused separate from the wrong done."18 2 The
resulting punishment under the atonement model will be less than
of strangers"), and retributivism because it typically does not account for the ways in which
punishment enables the wrongdoer "to atone for his crime and regain his moral standing in the
community," id. at 1837. He argues that "[r]etributivism's focus on justifying the basic claim that
wrongdoers deserve punishment in proportion to their wrongdoing-a claim made from the point
of view of the victim and of third parties-has blinded it to the fact that punishment also enables
wrongdoers to atone for their wrongs-a claim made from the wrongdoer's point of view." Id. at
1839. Restorativism and libertarianism, on the other hand, are criticized for giving us
"atonement without punishment." Id. at 1840. According to Garvey, "the 'overall purpose' of
restorative justice [or restorativism] 'is the restoration into safe communities of victims and
offenders who have resolved their conflicts' " through such processes as victim-offender
mediation, restitution, and community-based sanctions. Id. at 1842-43 (quoting Daniel W. Van
Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251,
258 (1993)). Imprisonment is used only as a " 'last resort' " to incapacitate the dangerous. Id. at
1844 (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 101-04 (1990)). Libertarianism proposes a minimalist approach that views
crimes as little more than torts and the criminal law as little more than a means to "redress
harm through compensation." See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1844-45; Randy E. Barnett,
Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977), reprinted in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 349, 354-60 (Randy E.
Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977). According to Garvey, both restorativism and libertarianism
fall short of atonement because they ignore the role of "punishment as moral condemnation." See
Garvey, supra note 8, at 1840-46.
181. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1824.
182. Id. at 1825 (citing GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6.5, at 482-83
(1978), as an example). Michael Moore has made a similar argument, albeit with slightly
different terminology: "It does matter to our overall desert what we do, as well as the culpability
with which we do it, and a penal system should reflect this dependence of desert on the
independent moral significance of wrongdoing [i.e., harm] in the amounts of punishment it metes
out." Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 237, 240 (1994).
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under retributive models, because the penance will not include any
"surcharge" for the harm the offender has caused. 83
Third, and for my purposes most important, the atonement
model explains (where retributivism often does not) why a remorseful
defendant should receive a lesser sentence than a remorseless
defendant. 84 Because retributivism justifies punishment by "look[ing]
backward" at the offender's culpable choice to commit a crime,18 5 it
does not typically consider repentance to be a mitigating sentencing
factor.18 6 Judges, juries, and the general public, however, typically
do. 187
The importance of a defendant's remorse in capital sentencing
is well documented. Most, if not all, death penalty jurisdictions allow
defendants to argue-and juries to find-remorse as a mitigating
factor.188 Prosecutors and capital defense lawyers generally recognize
remorse's important mitigating effect.18 9 And empirical studies of
183. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1825-26.
184. Id. at 1824.
185. DRESSLER, supra note 102, at 16; see also Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven" Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1012 (1996) ("[Retributivism is
deontological and backward-looking. In contrast to forward-looking consequentialist approaches
that justify punishment in the name of what might be, retributivism justifies punishment in the
name of what has been. Punishment strictly predicated on moral desert is blind to the future.").
But see John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment's Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 97 (1999)
(refusing to "concede that retribution is 'purely backward-looking,' as is so often said").
186. Garvey, supra note 8, at 1824. Jeffrie Murphy attempts to account for repentance in a
retributive theory by distinguishing between what he calls "grievance retributivism" (of the sort
advocated by Herbert Morris) and "character retributivism" (of the sort advocated by Michael
Moore). See Murphy, supra note 148, at 149. According to Murphy, "grievance retributivism"
posits that "punishment is deserved for responsible wrongful acts" and "the wrongfulness of
conduct at one time will not be affected by repentance at a later time." Id. Under "character
retributivism," on the other hand, which posits that "one's deserts are a function not merely of
one's wrongful acts, but also of the ultimate state of one's character," repentance "might well
play a crucial role; for a repentant person seems to reveal a better character than an
unrepentant person." Id. at 149-51.
187. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 8, at 1824 (noting "the law's well-established 'discount' for
repentance").
188. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 245 (2000) (noting the "unusually persuasive
mitigating evidence" offered by the defendant, including "his extreme remorse"); People v.
McIntosh, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214, 218 n.3 (Duchess Co. Ct. 1997) (noting that a capital defendant may
present evidence of remorse as a mitigating factor in the sentencing proceeding); see also
Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1604-05 & nn.20-21 (1998) (citing cases from fifteen other jurisdictions).
189. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1558 & n.1 (1998) (noting
that a "study of prosecutors' closing arguments in favor of a death sentence concluded that
'whenever possible, prosecutors emphasized the defendant's apparent lack of remorse' ") (quoting
Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase: A Content
Analysis of Closing Arguments, J. SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 125, 137)); Eisenberg et al.,
supra note 188, at 1606 & n.25 ("It is... important that the client, where appropriate, express
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juror's attitudes have confirmed that a capital defendant's perceived
remorse (or lack of remorse) is often a significant sentencing factor.190
While much of our empirical evidence about sentencing factors
comes from capital cases, the available data about noncapital
sentencing also suggests that sentencing judges view remorse as a
mitigating factor. In their influential study of pre-Guidelines
sentencing of white-collar defendants, Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat
found that "it is important for many judges that defendants recognize
the gravity of their offense, accept the blame for their misdeeds, and
express remorse or contrition for them."' 91 Under the Guidelines,
remorse has been codified as a mitigating factor under the rubric of
"acceptance of responsibility."'' 92  If remorse is present "to an
remorse, both for the victim and the victim's family.") (citing Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies
for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV. 331, 356 (1979)); Phyllis Brown, Testimony of
"Mitigating Circumstances:" What Purpose Does It Serve?, FED. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 5, 5
("Common wisdom is that a show of remorse may result in mitigation.").
190. One statistical study conducted interviews of over 150 jurors from forty-one capital
juries in South Carolina, including jurors from each of the state's capital cases between 1986 and
mid-1993. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 188, at 1600-01. The authors concluded that the
defendant's perceived remorse (or lack of remorse) was a significant factor in jurors' sentencing
decisions, so long as the jurors did not think the crime was especially "vicious." Id. A smaller
study of California jurors reached similar conclusions. See Sundby, supra note 189.
191. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 27, at 115-18 (recounting interviews with several
federal judges who indicated the importance of remorse and contrition as a sentencing
consideration, and not just in white-collar cases); see also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264,
282 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("There is a natural, and I believe sound,
disposition to adjust sanctions when an offender admits his responsibility .... I dare say that
many judges, possibly the over-whelming majority, respond in this way .... ); United States v.
Torres, No. 84 CR 583, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6968, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1987) ("Remorse is of
course a factor to be taken into account in the sentencing process .... ); Austin Sarat, Remorse,
Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW 168 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999) ("Traditionally, law has encouraged remorse by rewarding
it.").
192. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 3El.1. Section 3E1.1 provides for a two- or three-
level reduction in the defendant's offense level, which usually reduces a defendant's sentencing
range by approximately thirty percent. See id. Section 3El.1 does not address remorse per se.
See id. Instead, it directs judges to focus on the defendant's actions (e.g., truthfully admitting the
offending conduct, pleading guilty, and voluntarily making restitution or assisting in recovery of
the "fruits and instrumentalities" of the offense). Id. This conduct, however, is exactly the
conduct expected of a remorseful defendant. In any event, several circuits have "specifically held
that a moral element is implicit in acceptance of responsibility and is satisfied by the defendant's
expression of contrition and remorse." United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (10th Cir.
1998) (citing cases holding "that a moral element is implicit in acceptance of responsibility and is
satisfied by the defendant's expression of contrition and remorse"); see also Michael M. O'Hear,
Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility"- The Structure, Implementation, and
Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1525-26 &
nn.72-77 (1997) (noting, with some disapproval, that "virtually all [courts that] have pronounced
on the matter seem to endorse the notion that section 3E1.1 inquiry is fundamentally about
remorse or contrition").
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exceptional degree," an even larger sentence reduction is permitted
under the Guidelines. 193
Traditional punishment theory provides some explanation for
this common conception of remorse as a sentencing mitigator. From a
utilitarian perspective, remorse may have predictive value. The
contrite defendant, "having made his first step on the way to
rehabilitation," may be less dangerous and less likely to re-offend.194
This utilitarian view, however, tells only part of the story of remorse.
For one, reducing a sentence because a particular defendant is
remorseful will often flatly contradict the more common utilitarian
aim of general deterrence. More fundamentally, as Jeffrie Murphy has
argued, repentance surely means more than just "a resolution not to
commit wrong again." 195 Remorse is an independent virtue. It
represents a changing of the self, a disassociation from the
blameworthy self, that transforms the defendant into someone who is
not just less dangerous, but who is "better."196
Regardless of the theoretical justifications for viewing remorse
as mitigation, the idea has undeniable popular resonance. As Austin
Sarat has observed, popular culture "gives a central role to accepting
responsibility and expressing remorse in representations of crime and
punishment."197 As one example, Sarat points to the film Dead Man
Walking, which, he argues, dramatically and effectively reaffirms the
centrality of remorse in our judgment of the wrongdoer's character
and, by extension, his desert. 198 Similar treatments of remorse in
popular culture abound.1 99
193. See, e.g., Fagan, 162 F.3d at 1284-85.
194. Eisenberg et al., supra note 188, at 1606; see also Scott, 419 F.2d at 282 (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) (stating that remorse is a mitigating factor because the remorseful defendant "has
the stuff that portends future improvement"); Murphy, supra note 148, at 148-49 ("[I]t seems
obvious that repentant people are less likely to commit crimes again than are those criminals
who are unrepentant. Indeed, one might even suggest that controlling crime by provoking
repentance is just another way of describing the idea of special deterrence.").
195. Murphy, supra note 148, at 148-49 (criticizing the utilitarian view of repentance as
"hasty and superficial").
196. See Murphy, supra note 148, at 157 ("The repentant person has a better character than
the unrepentant person, and thus the repentant person.., simply deserves less punishment
than the unrepentant person."); Sarat, supra note 191, at 170 (stating that "remorse involves a
change of heart, an alteration of character"). In United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir.
1996), the Second Circuit court of appeals implicitly recognized that remorse is about more than
just crime prevention. In discussing the sentencing of cooperators, the court noted that "a
sentencing court is particularly well-positioned because of its experience-to evaluate the
moral worthiness, contrition, and rehabilitation of a defendant." Id. at 788.
197. See Sarat, supra note 191, at 171.
198. In Sarat's probative analysis, the central dramatic tension of Dead Man Walking
involves the efforts of the film's protagonist, Sister Helen Prejean, to get a death row inmate,
Matthew Poncelet, to accept responsibility for his part in a brutal double murder. See id. at 172-
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Garvey's theory of atonement is admittedly and explicitly
ideal-both in its notion of community and in its expectations of
wrongdoers and victims. 200 But even assuming (as we no doubt should)
that most communities, most wrongdoers, and most victims are less
than ideal, atonement is still a worthwhile process. 201 Applying the
atonement model to cooperators shows how.
B. Atonement and the Ideal Cooperator
In an ideal world, a cooperator would experience atonement by
voluntarily and wholeheartedly going through the four stages of
expiation. Even more ideally, the cooperator's motive would be pure:
he would endure expiation not to lessen his sentence, but to atone for
his wrong and to reconcile with society.
The ideal cooperator would come to cooperation having already
experienced the first stage of expiation-remorse for his wrong. While
this remorse would be largely internal, it would be reflected in the
decision to cooperate and, more importantly, in the decision and desire
to turn away from crime. The second stage of expiation-apology-
would be a more external process reflected formally in the cooperator's
guilty plea and informally, but perhaps more importantly, in a direct
communication of heartfelt remorse to the victim. The third stage of
expiation-restitution-would at least entail direct monetary
compensation to the victim for any pecuniary losses. For crimes
without an identifiable victim and for crimes where the harm is
nonmonetary, the cooperator's restitution will necessarily be more
indirect. That compensation obviously can take the form of traditional
community service. For the cooperator, it can also take the form of
cooperation: a community service in itself.
To complete the expiation, the cooperator must undergo the
final stage-punishment. In some respects, cooperation is its own
punishment because of the social ostracism and reduced opportunities
83. Poncelet eventually does accept responsibility and becomes genuinely remorseful on the eve
of his execution, which sets the stage for the ultimate question posed by the film: Having
committed a brutal murder and then repented, does Poncelet "deserve" to be executed? Id.
199. See id. at 171 ("Popular culture representations of crime and punishment often are
centrally tales of responsibility and remorse.").
200. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1846-47.
201. Garvey argues that forcing offenders through the process of atonement serves the valid
purpose of "moral education." Thus, the "morally ignorant" offender is taught to appreciate the
full extent of his wrongful conduct, while the "morally defiant" offender is at least taught how
members of a community should "respond to one another when they've wronged one another."
See id. at 1847-51.
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that typically accompany it.202 And though this ostracism may be
significant punishment for many cooperators, it will not by itself
satisfy the fourth stage of expiation, particularly because the end
result of cooperation (and its attendant ostracism) may be an ultimate
benefit to the cooperator (reconciliation with law-abiding
communities). Thus, to complete his expiation, the cooperator must
suffer additional punishment. This punishment need not be as severe
as the punishment imposed on the noncooperator, in recognition of the
extent to which cooperation is its own punishment and in recognition
of the cooperator's remorse. But to complete the process of expiation,
the cooperator must suffer-indeed, the ideal cooperator should
demand-additional punishment.
Having completed the process of expiation, ideally the
cooperator will be forgiven by victim and by society, and not only
because the cooperator has helped bring other wrongdoers to justice
but also, more importantly, because he has completed the process of
expiation: he is remorseful, he has apologized, he has done what he
can to pay back the victim and society, and he has suffered
punishment.
C. Atonement and the Selfish Cooperator
The ideal cooperator is, of course, just that: ideal. Most
cooperators decide to cooperate only to get a lesser sentence. Remorse
and the desire to atone for wrongs done rarely plays a significant part
in a cooperator's initial decision to cooperate. What, then, is the point
of the atonement model of cooperation?
Most importantly, the cooperator who begins cooperating for
purely selfish reasons may, at some point in the process, begin to
experience something like atonement. The cooperation process-
particularly the intensive debriefings and the indirect positive
reinforcement the cooperator receives for "coming clean"-may stir
feelings of remorse that a simple guilty plea does not. Moreover, few
cooperators want to see themselves as "rats." So it is inevitable that
many cooperators, as they seek to justify betraying their friends, tell
themselves that they are doing something worthwhile, that they are
helping society, that they are becoming one of the "good guys." 20 3 By
202. See supra notes 117-49 and accompanying text.
203. Of course, there are some cooperators who very obviously go through the cooperation
process reluctantly and with great resentment. There are other cooperators who feel strong
resentment but successfully mask it to enhance their chances for a sentence reduction.
Nevertheless, at least in my experience, it was quite common for cooperators to come to identify
with the prosecution and to see themselves as part of the prosecution "team," especially when the
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the end of the cooperation process, these cooperators may not be just
enduring a process that looks like atonement; they may actually
believe that they are making amends for their wrongdoing.
Even for the resolutely selfish cooperator, the cooperation
process simulates true atonement. Whether he feels remorse or not,
the selfish cooperator must be willing to turn his back on his criminal
associates and, by extension, on his own criminal livelihood. Whether
he feels like apologizing or not, the selfish cooperator must plead
guilty publicly and, if he testifies, must publicly recount his misdeeds
in excruciating detail. Whether he feels like making restitution or not,
the cooperator necessarily "gives back" to society by helping to bring
other wrongdoers to justice. While this restitution may be indirect
(and, for crimes of violence, woefully incomplete), for many federal
crimes there is no identifiable victim-the only harm is to society. 20 4
For the cooperator whose victim is "the community," cooperation is one
of the most direct forms of restitution possible, particularly since the
cooperation will often be against offenders who are operating in the
same community as the one harmed by the cooperator. And, of course,
whether he feels like being punished or not, the cooperator is
punished.
For the resolutely selfish cooperator, the cooperation process
can accomplish more than just simulated expiation. It can serve as a
means for teaching the cooperator how he should react to his
wrongdoing. Garvey refers to this as "moral education," 20 5 a term that
may conjure up uncomfortable images of nineteenth-century
penitentiaries. 20 6 But prosecutors routinely engage in this kind of
"education." Part of preparing a cooperator to testify involves ensuring
that the cooperator is willing and able to accept responsibility for his
wrongdoing. Prosecutors generally do this for tactical, not moral,
cooperation process was extensive. Given the psychological pressures inherent in that process-
particularly the enormous power that the prosecutor holds over the cooperator's fate-this kind
of "Stockholm Syndrome" is not surprising. It is also, in my view, enormously positive.
204. The most obvious examples of such "victimless" crimes are those in which the victim is
the federal government: counterfeiting, tax evasion, public benefits fraud, obstruction of justice,
and espionage. But even more significantly, most narcotics offenses are committed without an
identifiable victim other than "the community."
205. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1847-48 (citing R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS
(1986) and Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
208 (1984), as the "best recent statements" of the moral education theory of punishment).
206. See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON
101-16 (Norvall Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (describing the rise of the penitentiary
from 1820 to 1840 and the efforts of prison reformers to transform prisoners into law-abiding
citizens). "The shared assumption was that since the convict was not innately depraved but had
failed to be trained to obedience by family, church, school, or community, he could be redeemed
by the well-ordered routine of the prison." Id. at 117; see also Garvey, supra note 8, at 1848.
20031
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
reasons: an unrepentant cooperator makes an unsympathetic witness.
But in urging cooperators to accept responsibility for their
wrongdoing, prosecutors can indirectly push those cooperators toward
atonement.
In religious terms, the selfish cooperator may not experience
true contrition, but he at least experiences attrition-that sorrow
which is "motivated merely by fear."20 7 The atonement model, as
Garvey explains, hopes for true contrition, but "settles, more
realistically, for attrition." Thus, while we would prefer truly
repentant cooperators, we settle for selfish cooperators who
nevertheless endure expiation and, in the process, learn that society
expects them to be contrite and repentant. And even if the cooperator's
remorse is completely faked, faked remorse at least shows that the
cooperator is "aware of the community's censure and seeks to make
amends."208
V. COOPERATION AS PUNISHMENT AND ATONEMENT:
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Viewing cooperation as punishment and atonement makes
things look different. Most obviously, the cooperator's sentencing
discount appears more deserved. But this reconceptualization of
cooperation is concerned with more than just making cooperation
discounts look less distasteful. It also has practical implications for
how prosecutors use cooperators and how judges sentence them.
A. Using Cooperators
Prosecutors exercise significant discretion over the cooperation
process. Prosecutors decide which defendants get "signed up," the
charges to which they plead, how they are used, and whether their
assistance will be considered "substantial."20 9 Prosecutors typically-
207. See THOMAS N. TENTLER, SIN AND CONFESSION ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION 250
(1977), cited in Garvey, supra note 8, at 1850.
208. Amitai Etzioni, Introduction to REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note
148, at 1, 10 ('The advantage of false remorse stands out when one compares it to brazen
displays of unremorseful self-righteousness."); see also Garvey, supra note 8, at 1850 ("Faked
remorse is better than nothing. Indeed, doing the right thing, even for the wrong reason, can
sometimes lead to doing the right thing for the right reason.").
209. Prosecutors can also exercise significant influence over the ultimate sentence, even
absent a formal agreement on the extent of the cooperation departure. See supra note 74. In
some districts, the extent of the substantial assistance departure will be part of the cooperation
agreement. Id. In other districts, the prosecution will make a specific recommendation, which is
usually given great weight. Id. And even in those districts in which prosecutors do not
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and quite appropriately-make these decisions by using a utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis. 210 The benefit the cooperator brings (whether it
be more arrests, more convictions, more certain convictions, or
lengthier sentences) is weighed against the cost (reduced punishment
for the cooperator). But prosecutors also can-and should-consider
cooperation's broader implications in making those decisions. In many
respects these broader implications are retributive: the cooperator
who has suffered and the cooperator who has sought atonement
deserve less punishment. But there is also a utilitarian aspect to this
reconceptualization: The cooperator who has experienced atonement
will not only be a "better" person, he will also be a more law-abiding
person.
1. The Scope of Cooperation
If cooperation is its own punishment, then a substantial part of
the pain inflicted by cooperating comes from betraying one's friends.
The cooperator who betrays his closest friends will suffer far more
ostracism and alienation than a cooperator who rats on mere
acquaintances. The suffering is even less for a cooperator who rats on
his rivals. Prosecutors, therefore, should prefer cooperators who
cooperate against their accomplices, especially when a cooperator's
accomplices are his friends.
It may seem counterintuitive to say that prosecutors should
place more value on a cooperator whose disloyalty is more pronounced.
If loyalty is a virtue, then the cooperator who betrays his close friends
is the least virtuous of all. But it is this very disloyalty, and the
personal sacrifice it entails, that defines the character of the
cooperation. First, the more betrayal involved in the cooperation, the
more the cooperator will suffer attendant alienation and ostracism.
Second, the more difficult the cooperation, the more significant the
cooperator's decision becomes. The cooperator who is willing to turn
his back on his friends will have made a greater commitment to
turning his back on his wrongdoing. The pain from that betrayal helps
prepare the way for the cooperator's expiation. 211
Of course, cooperators who testify against acquaintances and
rivals may still suffer ostracism and alienation, and their decision to
recommend a specific sentence for cooperators, prosecutors can still significantly influence the
ultimate sentence by writing a "strong" or "weak" substantial assistance motion. Id.
210. Indeed, Department of Justice guidelines implicitly encourage this utilitarian approach.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
211. The cooperator who cooperates against his close friends is also less likely to commit
perjury-to base his cooperation on false accusations-than the cooperator who cooperates
against acquaintances or rivals.
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cooperate will still open themselves to the expiation process. But
prosecutors should be more skeptical of such cooperators (and not just
because they are more likely to lie). Because their decision to
cooperate involves less sacrifice and less commitment, their
sentencing discount will be less deserved, and their cooperation
experience will look less like expiation.
In many ways, prosecutors already favor cooperators for whom
the decision to cooperate is more difficult, though usually for
utilitarian reasons. The cooperator who turns on his accomplices-
particularly when those accomplices are his friends-usually makes a
more reliable and credible witness. At a minimum, he has less
incentive to lie than the cooperator who turns on mere acquaintances
or rivals. Perhaps the prototypical example of the cooperator with no
connection to his target is the jailhouse snitch who testifies about a
cellmate's "confession." Prosecutors are-or at least should be-
extremely skeptical of jailhouse snitches, most obviously because the
snitch's story is so easily fabricated. 212 Considering punishment and
atonement as part of cooperation provides prosecutors with additional
reasons to avoid such witnesses.
This broader view of cooperation also gives prosecutors
powerful reason to avoid third-party cooperation. When the work of
cooperating is done not by the cooperator but by a surrogate, the
cooperator may avoid suffering any of the alienation and ostracism
that can lessen his desert. Even more importantly, the cooperator will
not endure the expiation process. He may plead guilty, and he may be
punished, but he will not be forced to endure the excruciatingly
minute examination of his wrongdoing that accompanies debriefing
sessions, he will not make the detailed public apology that comes with
testifying, and he will not do the work that is his reparation.
2. The Scope of the Guilty Plea
The guilty plea is the cooperator's formal acceptance of
responsibility-one part of his apology and an important stage in his
expiation. To make that apology complete, to make his acceptance one
212. Some of the worst examples of erroneous convictions based on cooperator testimony
have come from jailhouse snitches. See, e.g., Dodd v. Oklahoma, 993 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2000) (observing that courts "should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants,"
and adopting special disclosure rules and cautionary instructions for such witnesses); James S.
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM L. REV. 2030 (2000) (noting several cases in
which jailhouse snitches were used to secure faulty convictions); Trott, supra note 62, at 1383-84
(discussing the case of "Mad Dog" Pruett, a jailhouse snitch who, having won his freedom by
falsely accusing another prisoner of murder, then went on a robbery spree that left four people
dead).
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of full responsibility, the cooperator should be required to plead guilty
to all of his wrongdoing. Thus, the cooperator who is arrested for
selling one kilogram of cocaine to an undercover officer should be
required to plead guilty to a charge that encompasses all of the drug
dealing he has done. The cooperator who is arrested for robbing a
bank should be required to plead guilty not only to the bank robbery,
but also to the muggings and auto thefts he has committed. The
cooperator who is arrested in an antitrust investigation should also be
required to plead guilty to his unrelated personal income tax evasion.
In many cases, the additional charges will not significantly
change the cooperator's sentencing exposure, particularly when the
additional crimes are minor or similar to the primary crime. But in
some cases, the additional exposure will be significant-for example,
the cooperator arrested for midlevel drug dealing who must also plead
guilty to a murder.213 Some United States Attorney's Offices already
require cooperators to plead guilty to all of their criminal conduct, but
others do not.21 4
For atonement to be complete, the cooperator must fully accept
responsibility for his wrongdoing. For the guilty plea to serve as a
formal apology, the cooperator must apologize for all his wrongdoing
and accept the consequences of that wrongdoing. For the punishment
to complete the expiation process, the cooperator must be punished for
all his wrongdoing.
213. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
214. See Gleeson, supra note 62, at 449 n.ll0. Judge Gleeson notes:
[The] practice of obtaining a full proffer of all prior crimes prevails in many districts,
including the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, but is not universal. For
example, some United States Attorney's offices will enter into cooperation agreements
that do not cover prior crimes of violence. A proffer session leading up to such an
agreement will therefore be limited-employing a "don't ask, don't tell" approach to
violent crimes.
Id. One way to implement this "don't ask, don't tell" approach is to give cooperators use
immunity for incriminating information disclosed pursuant to the cooperation agreement-a
common practice in some districts. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 225, 231 (3d
Cir. 2000). Indeed, the Guidelines specifically contemplate that prosecutors may grant such
immunity to cooperators:
Where a defendant agrees to cooperate with the government by providing information
concerning unlawful activities of others, and as part of that cooperation agreement the
government agrees that self-incriminating information provided pursuant to the
agreement will not be used against the defendant, then such information shall not be
used in determining the applicable guidelines range, except to the extent provided in
the agreement.
2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 1B1.8(a).
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3. Mechanisms of Remorse and Apology
The cooperator's expressions of remorse and apology need not
be limited to his court appearances. Ideally, the cooperator could
apologize directly to the victim. Our criminal justice system, for all its
recent focus on victims' rights, still provides little opportunity for
wrongdoers to apologize to their victims. Although some courts have
ordered defendants to apologize,21 5 those apologies have tended to be
forced and public, not voluntary and personal.216
A few courts and jurisdictions, however, have begun employing
rituals that do not force a wrongdoer to apologize, but rather give him
the opportunity to apologize. Often grouped under the rubric of
"restorative justice,"' 217 the most common of these rituals is victim-
offender mediation. The basic purpose of victim-offender mediation is
to give victims and offenders a forum to communicate with each other.
Typically, the communication is facilitated by volunteer mediators,
and the participants will discuss the effects of crime on their lives and
express their concerns and feelings. 218 Victims thus are given a chance
to tell the defendant-outside of the public and highly charged
sentencing hearing-how the crime affected their lives. And
defendants are given a chance to deliver a genuine apology, one that
expresses the defendant's understanding of the pain his crime caused
the victim. 219
215. See Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733,
791-94 (1998) (describing various court-ordered apology rituals).
216. Because they are forced, such rituals are often viewed more as shaming penalties than
as apologies. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
634 (1996); Garvey, supra note 8, at 1816.
217. For general descriptions of the restorative justice movement, see John Braithwaite,
Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 25 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999); DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS
STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE (1997). For a good, concise discussion of restorative justice in
practice, see Leena Kurki, Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice into American
Sentencing and Corrections, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS, (Dep't of Justice Sept. 1999),
available at www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/175723.pdf.
218. See Kurki, supra note 217, at 4; see generally MARK UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS THE
OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
219. Most restorative justice programs view victim-offender mediation, and other similar
rituals, as substitutes for punishment. See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 209-10 (1990) ("If
there is room for punishment as a restorative approach, its place would not be central."); Garvey,
supra note 8, at 1843 ("Put bluntly, restorativists really don't much care for punishment.").
Perhaps as a result, restorative justice rituals are used most often for juvenile crimes and minor
property offenses. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1840 n.166; Kurki, supra note 217, at 9. In the
atonement model, however, restorative justice rituals would not replace punishment, which
would remain the fourth stage of the expiation process. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1842-44.
Rather, the rituals would facilitate the apology, the second stage of the process. See id. at 1844
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It would be quite simple for prosecutors to make participation
in victim-offender mediation a condition of the cooperator's agreement.
Even absent a formal program, prosecutors could work with
community groups to set up ad hoc mediations. And even for crimes
without identifiable victims (such as most narcotics offenses and
offenses against the treasury), representative members of the
community could explain to the cooperator their views of his offense
and the effect it has on their community.
It is, I realize, quite another matter to convince prosecutors
that victim-offender mediation would be a good idea for cooperators.
Most prosecutors I know would react with horror at the thought of
putting a cooperator in a roomful of victims and allowing the
cooperator to apologize for his crimes. Think of the "3500 material"
that could be generated by such a session.220 One solution, of course,
would be to delay any victim mediation until after the cooperator has
completed his testimony. This solution, though, is less than ideal.
Apology is the second stage of the expiation process precisely because
it should immediately follow the offender's remorse. Having come to
an understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the offender
should want to make-and the victim is entitled to expect-a prompt
apology.
Prosecutors should not fear opening up cooperators to this
process. While mediation could create some tactical disadvantages for
prosecutors, 22' these disadvantages are likely to be outweighed by the
tactical advantages. The mediation-and the sincere apology that
should result from it--can only make the cooperator a better witness.
The cooperator who truly accepts responsibility and empathizes with
his victims will be a more sympathetic witness. He will also be a more
("[R]estorativism longs for atonement without punishment, but punishment-tragically-is for
us an inescapable part of atonement.").
220. The Jencks Act generally requires the prosecution to produce to the defendant any
witness statements that are in writing and adopted by the witness, or that reflect a
"substantially verbatim recital" of an oral statement by the witness. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).
Most prosecutors routinely make every effort to minimize the creation of such statements. See,
e.g., John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1836 &
n.172 (2001) (noting that "[p]rosecutors are trained to avoid 'creating Jencks material'" and that
"it is common for prosecutors to spend dozens of pretrial hours with cooperating witnesses
without creating one word of discoverable material"). Even if the mediation were conducted in a
way that did not create any written record, oral statements made by the cooperator-particularly
those in which the cooperator admitted his own wrongdoing-could still be discoverable as
exculpatory impeachment evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
221. In addition to the extra "3500 material" that could be created, an emotionally charged
mediation could cause a cooperator to say something that is false or inconsistent with his other
testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000) (requiring witnesses' written statements to be turned
over to the defense). Moreover, the process may lead the defendants against whom the cooperator
is cooperating to obtain advance notice of the prosecution's evidence.
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effective witness because he is likely to be less defensive about his
wrongdoing. By enthusiastically embracing the expiation process, the
cooperator can disavow his wrongdoing and distance himself from it.222
With that distance established, cooperators are more often able to
testify about their own wrongdoing in a way that is candid,
compelling, and credible. 223 And, trial tactics aside, the empathetic
and truly apologetic cooperator is much closer to atonement, a
worthwhile goal in itself.
4. Mechanisms of Reparation
Nearly all federal defendants who inflict a monetary harm are
ordered to pay restitution, 224 and cooperators are no different. But
many cooperators-particularly those involved in drug trafficking or
crimes of violence-inflict harm that is not monetary. And many of the
cooperators who inflict a monetary harm lack both the money to pay
restitution and the ability to earn that money in the future.
For most cooperators, the most effective form of reparation is
the cooperation itself. By assisting in the prosecution of other
offenders, cooperators can give back to society. Indeed, many
cooperators can give back to the very victims and community that they
harmed, by cooperating against their accomplices or against other
wrongdoers operating in the same community.
There is an additional avenue of reparation for cooperators that
is often overlooked: community service. Most often used as a
supplement to probation for white-collar offenders, community service
has been criticized as a sanction because it does not adequately
express society's condemnation. 225 But under the atonement model,
community service would not have to carry the weight of punishment
(punishment will come separately). Instead, community service would
222. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 1816 ("[A]n apology is the selfs way of accepting
responsibility for its wrongdoing but at the same time disavowing the wrong. An apology
distances and disassociates the true self from the guilt-tainted self.").
223. Some of the most effective cooperators I have encountered were former substance
abusers who had embraced the "twelve-step" program popularized by such organizations as
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. See generally ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS,
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS (1996). These witnesses were effective precisely because
they had experienced a process that looked very much like expiation: they had accepted
responsibility for their wrongs, they had apologized to those they had wronged, and they had
sought to make amends for their wrongs. That process-and the distance it created from their
former selves-allowed them to be open and candid about all of their wrongdoing, which
immeasurably enhanced their credibility with the jury.
224. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1) (2000) (making restitution mandatory for, among
other offenses, crimes of violence, drug crimes, and offenses against property).
225. See Kahan, supra note 216, at 625-30.
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be part of the cooperator's reparation-a concrete, hands-on way he
can give back to his community.226
B. Sentencing Cooperators
That cooperation can include punishment and atonement does
not necessarily mean that cooperators as a whole should be punished
less. It does suggest, however, that some cooperators should be
punished less than other cooperators. In particular, those cooperators
who have suffered as a result of their cooperation should be punished
less than those cooperators for whom the cooperation has been easy.
And, those cooperators who have moved toward atonement by
experiencing expiation should be punished less than cooperators who
have not. The task falls as much on prosecutors as on judges. Judges
must be prepared to give credit at sentencing for collateral suffering
and for expiation. But prosecutors, who are in a much better position
to understand the cooperator's situation, should include an evaluation
of the cooperator's collateral suffering and expiation in the substantial
assistance motion.
Considering a cooperator's collateral suffering does not require
much change in practice. Indeed, the Guidelines already direct
sentencing judges to consider the "risk of injury" faced by a cooperator
and his family.227 But to fully evaluate the cooperator's desert, the
court should consider not just physical danger, 228 but all the ostracism,
alienation, and attendant suffering that can flow from cooperation.
The Guidelines do not specifically provide for the consideration of such
suffering, 229 but sentencing judges could consider it in two ways. First,
the judge could consider collateral suffering not in determining the
extent of the departure (i.e., the number of levels to depart), but where
within the range to sentence the cooperator, a decision that is almost
226. In this respect, community service fits neatly with victim-offender mediation. When
victim-offender mediation is used as a substitute for punishment, the end product of the
mediation is often a "restitution agreement." Kurki, supra note 217, at 4. Because the primary
purpose of victim-offender mediation is not monetary restitution (indeed, "the agreement is often
seen as secondary to emotional healing and growth," id.), such reparations as community service
are common. See BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 180, at 104 (praising community service's
"reprobative effect" on the wrongdoer and "reintegrative effect" on the victim).
227. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1(a)(4) (allowing courts to consider "any
injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his
assistance").
228. Indeed, the Guidelines' directive that courts consider danger and risk of injury was
likely motivated by considerations of utility, not desert. A cooperator who exposes himself and
his family to danger needs more incentive to cooperate and thus a larger sentencing reduction.
229. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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wholly within the judge's discretion.230 Second, the judge could
consider cooperation's collateral consequences in evaluating the
cooperation itself.231 Because cooperators who are cooperating against
close friends often make better witnesses, 23 2 their assistance will have
been, in the language of the Guidelines, more "significan[t] and
useful[ ]."233
Considering a cooperator's expiation may require a more
significant shift in focus but is still possible under the existing
Guidelines. One barrier might appear to be the Guidelines themselves,
which direct that "[t]he sentencing reduction for assistance to
authorities shall be considered independently from any reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. '234 As the Commission explains it:
Substantial assistance is directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal
activities by persons other than the defendant, while acceptance of responsibility is
directed to the defendant's affirmative recognition of responsibility for his own
conduct. 235
The solution here is similar to the solution regarding a
cooperator's collateral suffering. At a minimum, the sentencing court
could consider the cooperator's expiation in deciding where within the
(departed to) range to sentence the cooperator. More fundamentally,
the court could consider the cooperator's expiation not simply as
evidence of his acceptance of responsibility, but as central to the
"significance and usefulness" of the cooperation. The cooperator who
experiences expiation has not just "accepted responsibility" within the
(rather minimal) requirements of the Guidelines.23 6 He has expressed
230. This approach might seem limiting because the judge's discretion is constrained by the
relatively narrow sentencing ranges. Yet, the approach could be quite effective in practice.
Although the reasons for a substantial assistance departure are reviewable on appeal, the extent
of the departure is effectively unreviewable. See, e.g., United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court's
discretionary downward departure from applicable sentencing guidelines). Thus, so long as the
judge says that the collateral suffering will be considered only in deciding where within the
range to sentence the cooperator, the ultimate sentence will be insulated from appeal. See id.
Indeed, most of the judges whom I saw sentence cooperators in the Southern District of New
York simply departed downward to a particular sentence instead of departing downward a
certain number of offense levels and then sentencing the cooperator within a new range.
231. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1(a)(3).
232. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
233. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5K1.1(a)(1).
234. Id. § 5K1.1, cmt. n.2.
235. Id.
236. See 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 3E1.1. Although a guilty plea does not
automatically entitle a defendant to an acceptance of responsibility reduction, most defendants
who plead guilty and do not lie in the process receive the reduction. See O'Hear, supra note 192,
at 1534-42 (discussing a study indicating that, at least in one district, section 3E1.1 operates "as
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remorse, apologized, and made reparations; and he has done so in the
context of cooperating. His expiation is not simply an internal
conversion, it is an integral part of his "substantial assistance." The
closer a cooperator comes to true contrition, the more sincerely he
makes his apology, and the more he is motivated to make reparations,
the better cooperator he will be. In the language of section 5K1.1, the
closer the cooperator comes to atonement, the more "truthful" and
"reliable" he will be, and the more "significan[t] and useful[]" his
cooperation will be.237
One obstacle to considering atonement is that it can be difficult
to judge the genuineness of a wrongdoer's remorse. This obstacle,
though, is not insurmountable. Remorse, though it can be easy to fake,
is routinely considered by judges and by capital juries in imposing
sentences. 238 And the judge sentencing a cooperator (along with the
prosecutor recommending the sentence) will be in a much better
position to evaluate the extent of a cooperator's expiation than the
judge or jury who sentences a typical defendant-even a capital
defendant. For example, as important as remorse can be in capital
sentencing, juries often base their evaluation of the defendant's
remorse on little more than the defendant's testimony during the
penalty proceeding. Indeed, in most cases, jurors reach conclusions
about the defendant's remorse simply by judging his appearance
during the trial.239 And in noncapital cases, judges often evaluate a
defendant's remorse or lack of remorse based on minimal evidence
(such as statements to the probation officer or a statement at
sentencing) that is often filtered through the defendant's attorney.
The cooperator, by contrast, has been through a process that is
designed both to make him remorseful and to expose him if he is not.
Lengthy debriefing sessions, intensive witness preparation, and public
trial testimony (including cross-examination) all provide a window
into the cooperator's remorse and contrition.240 Prosecutors (and, by
extension, sentencing judges) 241 are thus in a much better position to
evaluate the genuineness of the cooperator's expiation.
a more-or-less automatic plea discount," and arguing that many other districts follow a similar
practice).
237. 2002 GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § 5KI. 1.
238. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
239. See Sundby, supra note 189, at 1561-62 ("Above all else.., the defendant's demeanor
and behavior during the actual trial shaped the jurors' perceptions of the defendant's remorse.")
240. Participation in victim-offender mediation might also provide useful information about
a cooperator's contrition.
241. Prosecutors are usually in a much better position than the sentencing judge to make
this judgment because many cooperators do not testify at trial and those who do are often
sentenced by a judge other than the one who presided at that trial.
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It bears repeating that the atonement model's focus on remorse
and expiation does not mean that the cooperator should not be
punished. Punishment is an essential part of the atonement process;
without it, expiation cannot be complete, and atonement is not
possible. 242 But, the atonement model may suggest that some
cooperators should be punished less. If a cooperator has undergone
expiation, if he has moved toward atonement, not only has his
cooperation been more useful, but his moral culpability has been
lessened and his debt to society at least partially paid.
CONCLUSION
It has not been my aim to paint an overly rosy picture of
cooperation. Indeed, I have touched only indirectly on what is
probably the most significant problem with cooperation: cooperator
perjury. 243 Yet, while the punishment and atonement aspects of
cooperation may say little about how to combat cooperator perjury,
they do address some of the other problems typically attributed to
cooperation. For one, a standard criticism of cooperation is that it
introduces unwarranted disparity into "a sentencing regime that
values uniform sentencing above all else."244 This reconceptualization,
however, suggests that at least some of the cooperator's sentencing
discount may be deserved-both because cooperation is its own
punishment and because atonement lessens the cooperator's desert.
Moreover, the benefits to society from cooperation may exceed the
standard crime-fighting benefits. While cooperation remains primarily
a crime-fighting tool, it can also serve the individual cooperator, the
victim, and society. When the cooperation process serves as expiation,
the cooperator is moved closer to atonement-an ephemeral goal, no
doubt, but one worth the effort.
242. See supra notes 176-78, 202 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 116, 211.
244. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 564.
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Contractual Choice of Law and the
Prudential Foundations of Appellate
Review
David Frisch 56 Vand. L. Rev. 57 (2003)
Within the past decade, professional organizations interested in
making the law better suited to commercial transactions have begun
to advocate the proposition that contracting parties should have al-
most unlimited power to choose the law to govern their relationship.
The new choice-of-law framework resulting from these reform efforts
will provide parties with an expanded menu of legal regimes from
which to choose when drafting their contract and, in turn, will lead
to a more frequent use of choice-of-law clauses. Indeed, some have
even suggested that omitting such a clause may soon become mal-
practice for the commercial lawyer. Given both the trend toward
permitting unlimited contractual choice of law and the growing
popularity of these clauses, it is worth pausing to examine how the
judicial system might appropriately respond. In particular, this Ar-
ticle addresses a problem that has thus far been overlooked by both
courts and commentators. That problem involves the gains and
losses of appellate review of trial court rulings on the law of another
state or nation. What, exactly, does judicial review of unsettled ques-
tions of foreign law accomplish? What is its price? These questions
are of both considerable theoretical interest and immense practical
importance. Their resolution calls for an inquiry into the allocation
of judicial authority and in its production of outcomes in the real
world. The purpose of this Article is to provide an answer to these
and other questions. This Article suggests an approach to judicial
review that will improve the operation of appellate courts while ap-
propriately distributing authority among all levels of the judiciary.
